Already within his first 100 days, President Nawrocki reshaped the decision-making architecture of the Polish executive by transforming the Chancellery into a fully operational center of analysis, legislative review, and strategic coordination. The appointment of an experienced, security-oriented leadership team in both the Chancellery and the National Security Bureau created a vertically integrated chain of decision-making that connects political guidance, expert assessment, and interagency coordination. This was reinforced by a multi-layer advisory structure: a group of high-level advisors providing substantive input on the 21-Point Plan, alongside newly established deliberative councils designed as incubators for regulatory proposals and, ultimately, for the drafting of a new constitution, which Nawrocki emphasized as a core objective of his first term.

Procedural changes were equally important. The President expanded the analytical capacity of the Chancellery and is enforcing an informal – yet increasingly consequential – practice of pre-legislative consultation with the government. His early use of vetoes, presidential legislative initiatives, and referrals to the Constitutional Tribunal signaled a far more assertive institutional posture. This approach has been sharply criticized by the current government, unaccustomed to such a proactive model of political cohabitation and increasingly frustrated by the President’s assertiveness. Nevertheless, the combination of organizational restructuring and procedural activation has shifted the presidency from a reactive to proactive posture, altering the operational balance between the President, the Cabinet, and the Parliament.

The constitutional balance after the first hundred days of President Nawrocki’s term has shifted visibly toward a more assertive presidency. During this period, he signed 70 bills into law but vetoed 13 others — an unprecedented level of early assertiveness in modern Polish politics. For comparison, previous presidents used their veto power far more sparingly over an entire term. President Komorowski issued just 4 vetoes in five years, President Duda 19 in ten years, and President Wałęsa 27 during his single term. Nawrocki’s early use of constitutional instruments signals a clear intent to defend his programmatic agenda and assert the presidency as a fully independent executive actor. This approach has prompted strong political backlash from the government, which increasingly frames the President as an obstacle to its legislative program.

Despite this political tension, the constitutional ecosystem is not uniformly

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confrontational. In the critical domains of defense and national security, cooperation remains functional. This was most visible after the incident of September 10th, when the Presidential Chancellery reported a breach of Polish airspace by Russian drones. The President first took part in a briefing at the Operational Command and a meeting at the National Security Bureau, and two days later convened the National Security Council with the participation of representatives of all major political forces. The Head of the National Security Bureau has also emphasized constructive relations with the Minister of Defense — cooperation that enabled nineteen general-officer promotions in the Polish Armed Forces. At the same time, friction persists with other ministries, as demonstrated by the President’s refusal to approve first-rank officer nominations in the intelligence services, citing procedural concerns.

Overall, the first 100 days have produced a hybrid equilibrium: politically adversarial, constitutionally assertive, but operationally cooperative in areas of national security. This marks a departure from the more passive model of previous presidencies and has rightly re-centered the office of the President as a decisive institutional counterweight within Poland’s constitutional order.

Legislative Output

Since his appointment on August 6th, President Nawrocki and his administration have been exceptionally active in the legislative sphere. While the Polish President cannot directly adopt laws, he holds the prerogative of legislative initiative — a tool historically used sparingly. Nawrocki’s presidency marks a clear departure from this tradition. Already on his second day in office, he submitted a bill securing the continued implementation of the Centralny Port Komunikacyjny, a flagship strategic infrastructure hub project combining an international large-scale airport with a high-speed rail network. Although the current government under Donald Tusk has altered its scope, public support for the project remains high, and the President’s intervention signaled a willingness to defend long-term national development priorities.

In the following weeks, he introduced further bills, including changes exempting families with two or more children from income tax to increase tax benefits for families with children, and a legislative package aimed at safeguarding agricultural land for Polish farmers. After vetoing several government bills, the President also proposed measures freezing electricity prices and supporting Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland. These initiatives — all submitted within the first 30 days — were followed by additional presidential bills over the subsequent weeks, covering

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citizenship law, the status of maritime ports, pension policy, and, most prominently, a proposal to reduce electricity prices by 33 percent, one of his core campaign commitments. Many of these projects were developed not only within the Chancellery but also with direct input from the newly appointed advisors, illustrating a more structured and expert-driven legislative process consistent with the institutional reforms outlined earlier.

While government officials have criticized some proposals on grounds of fiscal feasibility, the President has made clear that his role will not be limited to analysis, symbolic gestures, or — as claimed by his opponents — obstruction. Instead, he intends to make full and proactive use of the constitutional instruments available to the presidency. The parliamentary majority, controlled by the government, has so far shown limited willingness to cooperate, as demonstrated by the swift rejection of the bill supporting Ukrainian citizens during its first reading. Other presidential proposals are currently under committee review or awaiting formal introduction. Despite this resistance, Nawrocki’s legislative tempo and strategic use of prerogatives underscore a presidency determined to shape the national agenda directly, not merely respond to it.

Transatlantic Axis

Already within the first weeks of his presidency, President Nawrocki placed foreign policy at the center of his strategic agenda, using early high-level engagements to anchor Poland firmly within the transatlantic security system. His visit to Washington less than a month after taking office — and the exceptionally warm welcome from President Donald Trump — signaled both a personal rapport and a shared strategic worldview. The intensity of bilateral contacts, including several phone calls and meetings on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, reaffirmed the unique status of the Polish–American partnership. This dynamic was further underscored by the new U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Tom Rose, who publicly declared that “Poland is more than an ally — Poland is family.” The most concrete outcome came with President Trump’s announcement that U.S. troop levels in Poland would not be reduced under the global posture review and may in fact increase — a major strategic win for Nawrocki and a setback for a government that had openly questioned the utility of the visit. This commitment stands out against the backdrop of broader U.S. posture adjustments in Europe, including reductions and reconfigurations in other parts of NATO’s eastern and south-eastern flank.

Poland’s commitment to defense spending over the years has also played a part,

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with many American conservatives praising Poland as among its most responsible allies and signaling a heightened willingness to engage in security cooperation with Poland over other allies precisely because of these demonstrated responsible defense spending policies. The overall number of American troops in Europe is very likely to decrease in the coming years as the United States shifts resources to the Indo-Pacific. However, the troops that do remain in Europe may well shift east, with more permanent basing structures for U.S. troops in Poland. Beyond the politics, there is also a clear strategic logic to this potential shift. When the bases housing American troops in Germany were built they were frontline installations within easy reach of the Iron Curtain, defending West Germany from Soviet aggression. In today’s Europe, the lines have moved far to the east, and for reasons of both deterrence and military planning it only makes sense for American troops that remain in Europe to be closer to what would become the frontlines in a conflict.

American conservatives recognize that Poland is now among the leading European states in both security and economic terms. American national security experts routinely present Poland as a role model for other NATO allies or even for Indo-Pacific allies, exhorting these other governments to “be more like Poland.” American conservatives generally think it is in the American national interest to elevate Poland’s role in NATO decision making and to prioritize Poland for increased security cooperation in Europe.

On his return from Washington, President Nawrocki met with Pope Leon XIV, signaling the central role of Christian values in his presidency, and held talks with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, strengthening ties with a leading conservative figure in Europe. Yet transatlantic alignment is only one pillar of Nawrocki’s strategy. The President and his administration place equal emphasis on regional frameworks such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. His visits to Lithuania, Finland, Estonia, and Slovakia — combined with participation in the Arraiolos meeting of eleven European presidents — reflect a deliberate effort to consolidate a Northern–Eastern security arc. The outreach to Finland and the Baltic States has already prompted discussion about expanding the Bucharest Nine into a broader “Warsaw Thirteen,” integrating the Nordic countries into a single strategic platform. A planned visit to Hungary, meetings with President Orbán, and participation in the upcoming V4 summit suggest a renewed engagement with Budapest and an effort to revive the Visegrad format on more pragmatic, interest-driven terms.

This regional diplomacy is complemented by methodical efforts to maintain constructive, if demanding, dialogue with France and Germany. Meetings with

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Presidents Steinmeier and Macron highlighted areas of divergence — particularly on migration, EU economic governance, and Mercosur — but also reaffirmed that Poland’s security and economic interests require stable, honest relations with both partners. Nawrocki’s approach positions Poland as a state that anchors itself in the transatlantic alliance while simultaneously shaping regional coalitions and asserting its sovereignty within EU debates.

From the American perspective, increased security ties between Poland and its neighbors on all sides, from the Nordics to the Baltics to Germany and France, is a major benefit to both American and Polish national security interests. The United States seeks to raise European military capabilities in order to decrease the number of military capabilities required by the United States to enable collective deterrence in Europe. American policymakers are deeply concerned about the potential for simultaneous conflicts in Europe and Asia and are trying to mitigate the risks involved for the U.S. and its allies in just such an eventuality. The goal is to enable European militaries to take the lead in their own defense, even while maintaining certain key U.S. military capabilities in Europe. The U.S. recognizes that a limited number of American ground troops will need to remain, and the U.S. will continue to provide the nuclear umbrella, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and control infrastructure, along with certain key assets that have an outsized effect on deterring Russia such as select air defense or deep strike capabilities. Logistics hubs that enable U.S. troops to quickly surge back to Europe if needed and that allow the U.S. to project airpower across multiple theaters are also likely to remain.

However, the overall numbers and capabilities will certainly decrease, so American policymakers look to Warsaw, Berlin, Paris, and the Nordic and Baltic capitals in particular to work more closely together and to provide more of the capabilities that the United States provided in the past.

Taken together, these efforts illustrate a coherent strategic logic: strengthen the U.S. alliance, consolidate Poland’s leadership on NATO’s Eastern Flank, broaden regional coalitions in the Baltic and Central Europe, and engage Europe’s major powers on the basis of sovereignty and security. In this architecture, Poland emerges not only as a reliable American ally but as a regional leader capable of driving collective initiatives and influencing the broader European agenda.

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Strategic Convergence

President Nawrocki’s policy is one of the clearest practical examples of the burden-sharing model promoted by the Trump administration and increasingly expected from U.S. allies in Europe. His strong emphasis on institutionalizing and operationalizing regional alliances — and taking a leading role in shaping their agendas — aligns directly with Washington’s call for a more self-reliant Europe. At the same time, maintaining exceptionally close ties with the United States mirrors the strategic logic behind Trump’s approach to key partners. This is complemented by Poland’s record-high defense spending as a share of GDP, a trend initiated under the previous government and continued today.

Yet it is not only the level of spending that matters, but also how and where it is directed. Poland procures a significant share of its military equipment from the United States, both to enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and to ensure technology transfer to the Polish defense industry. Large-scale infrastructure projects such as Aegis Ashore in Redzikowo or the APS-2 hub in Powidz further anchor the U.S. military presence in Poland and strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. With rapidly growing capabilities — Poland is building one of the largest and fastest-growing conventional armies in Europe — the country is preparing to act as a genuine regional first responder, enabling the United States to adjust its global posture and focus more heavily on strategic deterrence. In this regard, Poland’s trajectory contrasts with the still cautious and delayed defense modernization efforts of some Western European allies which continue to rely more on political declarations than on hard capabilities.

This alignment is reinforced by the strong personal connection between President Trump and President Nawrocki. Both leaders share a similar worldview: strengthening national sovereignty, prioritizing national interest, and reshaping alliances around capable, reliable partners. Energy cooperation adds another layer to this convergence — from U.S. LNG imports, which help position Poland as a regional energy hub, to forward-looking joint projects in nuclear energy and SMR technology. At the same time, Warsaw remains acutely aware that U.S. foreign policy is firmly rooted in the American national interest and therefore treats deeper defense integration as a complement to, not a substitute for, sustained national investments and regional coalition-building.

President Nawrocki’s clear commitment to preventing mass migration and the numerous societal problems that stem from it is recognized and applauded by

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American conservatives in Washington who are also engaged in a massive effort to prevent and even reverse the levels of mass migration seen in previous administrations. Poland’s continuing efforts and public statements in support of resisting pressure for mass migration are helpful both to American conservatives and to conservatives across the rest of Europe engaged in similar public debates and efforts.

At the same time, Poland is ready to assume a more active role within the European Union, driven not only by shared values across the Atlantic but also by converging interests and a preference for an EU understood primarily as an economic community rather than a vehicle for strategic autonomy detached from the United States.

Several initiatives could further reinforce Poland’s position — both regionally and as a key linchpin in the transatlantic system. Expanding cooperation with the United States, beyond already existing areas, remains crucial. While the U.S. military presence in Poland is strong, Warsaw continues to argue that a permanent U.S. base would meaningfully strengthen deterrence and highlight Poland’s role as a leading security provider in the region. Similarly, progress toward an ITAR waiver would significantly accelerate defense industrial cooperation and elevate Poland’s technological capacity, a goal very much in line with both Polish and American national security objectives.

These initiatives would directly strengthen Poland, but they would also stabilize NATO’s eastern flank — one of the most sensitive regions in the global security landscape. Poland has already demonstrated that it is not only a reliable military ally but also a moral leader, hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees. What Poland needs now is to deepen its strategic resilience and continue investing in initiatives that reinforce this long-term capability.

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