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THE SECURITY OF POLAND AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IN MADRID

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REPORT

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RESEARCH REPORT

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ABSTRACT

The theoretical study includes studies of Poland's international position from the perspective of history, international relations theory and current discourse. The perspective of history makes it possible to see the numerous mistakes that Polish elites committed in the modern period against the background of European trends. Poland is one of the few countries in Europe that has both served as a regional power and disappeared from the map. The Polish lands have experienced the rule of various types of regimes (monarchies, noble republic, insurgent governments, dictatorships, occupation governments, Nazism, communism, liberal democracy).

Nowadays, Poland is a medium-sized country with high growth potential. To determine the viability of the medium-sized state in the international system, a survey of dozens of analytical concepts used in international studies was conducted. On this basis, directives for security policy are presented. The first part of the report closes with a comparative analysis of the visions of Poland's security policy presented in the current national discourse. To verify the data collected, it was decided to conduct further qualitative research.

The empirical study includes information on the interviews and expert surveys conducted, and consists of a discussion of selected 9 issues, along with quotes from experts. The following are discussed in turn: the position of Poland after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the consequences of the Madrid NATO summit, the consequences of the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, the strengths and weaknesses of Polish security policy, opportunities and threats to Polish security policy, Poland's international roles, scenarios for Poland, and proposals for improvements in security policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The first part of the report analyses Poland's international position as a medium-sized state that takes care of its security through both its own policies and alliances. The second part gives the floor to experts who assessed the impact of recent international developments on Polish security policy. Summarising both parts of the report, it was decided to make recommendations for decision-makers in the areas of external (diplomacy, armed forces) and internal (civil protection, crisis management, security administration) security policy.

At a time of ongoing war in Eastern Europe, it recommends:

- **increasing personnel and material commitment** to the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces and their reserves
- **strengthening institutions developing strategies and doctrines** for the Republic of Poland's enlarged army (War Studies University, Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces)
- **strengthening the staff of ministries responsible for security** by expanding training (e.g. KSAP, universities) and improving working/service conditions in civilian and military structures, especially those responsible for foreign relations, tenders and equipment acquisition
- **working towards a cross-party consensus** for the realisation of security policy goals ("round table", "roadmap", "security policy development charter", a document committing politicians to defined goals, regardless of party affiliation)
- **taking action for Poland's innovative military specialisation in the EU and NATO** through participation and organisation of cooperation in the military, industrial, training, field and staff exercise sphere
- **conduct reconnaissance and foresight research** on the opportunities and conditions for a "new opening" in relations with key partners

offering partners credible scenarios ("roadmaps") to expand the available formats for intergovernmental cooperation over the next few years

expanding inter-ministerial cooperation of the B9 countries, following the example of the Nordic countries

- **expanding the business and intellectual forums of the countries of the region, as well as bilateral forums** in order to strengthen the message about the common interests of the Central and Eastern European region
- **proposing general priorities for Polish foreign policy** for the rest of this decade
- **strengthening the position of think tanks** responsible for providing analysis and expertise on the international situation, enabling the production of materials in multiple languages
- **supporting the process of establishing branches of American and Western European media and expert institutions in Warsaw**, in order to increase the impact of the Polish message

- **increasing funding for Polish cultural institutes to enable them to expand their activities** with language courses, cultural events, strengthening the presence of Polish elites
- **improving media communication** by supporting foreign channels of Polish media
- **expanding cooperation with the elites of post-Soviet countries** disillusioned with Russia's policies, within the framework of Polish cultural institutes or otherwise
- **passing a law on civil protection** and rebuilding the country's civil defence system, based on new emergency services (consider creating a separate ministry).
- **planning investments in restoring critical infrastructure that has been neglected for decades** in each voivodeship (shelters, resource and reserve bases, civil protection training centres)
- **identifying opportunities to finance the expansion of the gas port, the oil port and other** investments to further increase the degree of energy security
- **strengthening tools to counter undesirable influences** of hostile third countries
- **monitoring and supporting the development of Polish cadres** in EU and NATO institutions
- **beginning an audit of the country's security systems** to gain information on opportunities for improvement based on the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war; target preparation for a new strategic review of national security.

REPORT - THEORETICAL STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Security policy is a purposeful activity of state institutions, whose task is to 1) create, 2) maintain, and 3) develop national security systems of a military and non-military nature, which are the state's response to challenges and threats of domestic and foreign origin. Historically, security policy derives from the modern *ius politiae*, or the right of the ruler to maintain public order. Based on this law, the first institutions of internal security administration were created, which, together with the parallel institutions of diplomacy and the army, formed the basis for the existence of today's so-called "ministries of security".

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland defines (Article 5) five key tasks of the Polish state which include: (1) guarding the independence and inviolability of its territory, (2) ensuring human rights and civil liberties, (3) ensuring the security of citizens, (4) guarding the national heritage, and (5) ensuring the protection of the environment, guided by the principle of sustainable development. The Constitution further indicates that state security is a synergy of internal security and external security. Indeed, traditional security policy includes the concerns of the aforementioned ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs and defence.

Nowadays, security questions are being extended to issues related to economics, ecology, energy, food, and technology. The specific powers of the various ministries in this regard are defined *by the Law of September 4, 1997 on Departments of Government Administration*. The law emphasises (Article 37) that each ministry is obliged to carry out the tasks in the field of defence and security specified in the law, with the exception of matters that, under separate regulations, belong to other government administration bodies and state organisational units¹. Thus, security issues are state-wide and are addressed through various state tasks, although at their core are the Ministries of (1) Foreign Affairs, (2) Internal Affairs and (3) National Defence.

This research report addresses the problems of Poland's contemporary security policy in the domestic and international context. The backdrop for the project is both the international situation (the NATO summit in Madrid; the Russian-Ukrainian war) and the expert debate, covering issues specific to the so-called ministries of security: foreign policy, defence, strategy, diplomacy, civil protection, army expansion, infrastructure development, and internal security institutions, etc.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT ARE:

- 1) Diagnosis of the current security situation in Central and Eastern Europe
- 2) Defining threats to Polish foreign policy
- 3) Identifying scenarios for regional development
- 4) Preparation of proposals to strengthen the impact of Polish foreign policy

¹ Law of September 4, 1997 on government administration departments, Journal of Laws Dz. U. No 109 item 943.

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES ARE:

- to respond to threats from the policies of the Russian Federation
- to increase public awareness of threats to the security of the Republic of Poland
- to provide data for the process of formulating Polish foreign policy strategy
- to strengthen the soft power of Poland in international relations
- active co-creation of NATO's strategic culture
- creating the image of Poland as a "security leader" in the region
- integration of the region's expert communities around the priorities of Polish foreign policy

For the purposes of the report, qualitative research of a theoretical (found data) and empirical (evoked data) nature was conducted.

The first part includes advanced studies of resources such as 1) legislation and official state documentation; 2) monographs on foreign and security policy; 3) papers on the theory and analysis of foreign and security policy; 4) current reports, analyses, studies, commentaries of expert circles. Based on the data collected, a theoretical study is presented, which includes recommendations for state policy derived from the history and theory of international relations.

The second part of the report includes materials obtained during interviews and expert surveys. For the study, a total of 29 in-depth interviews and questionnaires (236 statements) were conducted on nine key issues of Polish security policy, such as:

1. The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Poland's position in Europe
2. The impact of the NATO summit in Madrid on Poland's security policy
3. The impact of the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO on Polish security policy
4. Defining Poland's international roles
5. Strengths and weaknesses of Polish security policy
6. Opportunities and threats for Polish security policy
7. Scenarios favourable to Polish security policy
8. Scenarios unfavourable to Polish security policy
9. Prospects for changes in Polish security policy

Most of the statements were recorded in September 2022. The respondents were selected specialists, associated for many years with the problems of security policies, who are military officers, diplomats, analysts, journalists and academics by profession. Interviews were not conducted among active politicians. The vast majority of respondents have degrees and numerous publications on Polish foreign and security policy. The task of the experts was to try to assess the impact of external events on the policy of the Polish state, and to determine the directions of security policy in the internal and external aspects.

The report is part of the debate on security policy taking place in political, expert and academic circles in Poland. Examples of reports that have sparked debate on Poland's military and non-military security systems include, for example, reports by the Supreme Chamber of Control on the crisis in civil defence systems (2019), or on ways to train the army (2020), reports on the modernisation and changes in the Polish army, published by the circles of the Pułaski Foundation, the Stratpoints Foundation, or the Centre for Strategic Analysis. The author also noted the Jagiellonian Club's reports on Poland's foreign policy priorities (2021)

and Strategy & Future's report on the so-called "New Model Army" (2022), which stirred discussions on the shape of Poland's defence policy.

The following page presents recommendations from key analytical reports generated in the international debate and concerning NATO's eastern region (the so-called *Eastern frontier*). This report complements the debate in the field regarding a holistic view of changes in the security policy of the Polish state and proposes undertakings to support Polish security policy for the next decade. For their support in the work on the report, I would like to thank the members of the Board of Directors of the Sobieski Institute in the persons of legal advisors Filip Seredyński and Bartłomiej Michałowski, as well as the Director of the Sobieski Institute office, Angelika Gieraś. The research report is not the official position of the Sobieski Institute or the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The opinions expressed in the report are based on the research results obtained by the author.

SELECTED REPORTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EASTERN NATO COUNTRIES (2017-2022).

2017 (RAND) NATO's Eastern Flank and its Future Relationship with Russia. The report stresses, inter alia, the needs for (1) revision of the NATO-Russia Act of State, (2) creation of a "military Schengen", (3) permanent presence of NATO troops in Poland and the Baltic States. Eastern countries are hoping for the involvement of larger NATO forces. Southern states would prefer NATO involvement in the Middle East and North Africa, but after the fiasco of the so-called Arab Spring, this seems unlikely.

2018 (CEPA) Securing the Suwalki Corridor. Strategy, Statecraft, Deterrence and Defence. The report is about maximising the Alliance's effectiveness in deterrence, defence and counter-attack. Strengthening of (1) early warning, (2) local forces and (3) infrastructure is indicated. The authors propose measures to neutralise the threat to the so-called Suwałki corridor, by: strengthening military mobility, strengthening intelligence reconnaissance, speeding up decision-making mechanisms (establishing definitions of "crisis" and "attack," adopting Article 5 automaticity, establishing a division headquarters in Poland, greater independence of the VJTF), investing in infrastructure for military purposes (e.g., HET - Heavy Equipment Transport), developing officer cadres, preventing Russian policies of accomplished facts.

2019 (CEPA) Strengthening NATO's Eastern Flank. A Strategy for Baltic-Black Sea Coherence. The report develops the concepts of accelerating the speed of (1) recognition, (2) decision, and (3) assembly to build greater consistency in the Alliance's response. According to the authors, there is a need to support NATO forces in Romania, develop the infrastructure of the Three Seas region and expand cybersecurity capabilities. An expansion of control and reporting centres is needed, as well as improved defence plans for the Black Sea region in particular, as Russia may use any asymmetry to its advantage.

2019 (CSBA) Strengthening the Defence of NATO's Eastern Frontier. The report analyses NATO's deterrence capabilities. The challenges for NATO are (1) Russia's time and distance advantage in Eastern Europe, (2) Russian A2/AD systems, and (3) the politics of accomplished facts. The authors' recommendations include expanding US forces in Poland to two ABCTs, strengthening Poland's anti-access umbrella, developing ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), improving Poland's missile and air defence capabilities, and replacing post-Soviet equipment with new capabilities.

2020 (CEPA) One flank, one threat, one presence. The report includes more than a dozen recommendations for NATO, such as publicising threat analysis, improving situational awareness, strengthening SACEUR,

expanding outsourcing, supporting Romania (the new commands in Craiova, Bucharest and Sibiu do not cover naval issues), strengthening the capabilities of Ukraine and Georgia, investing in the region's economic potential, increasing interoperability (insufficient levels of readiness, capability, mobility, coordination and ammunition stocks).

2020 (ICDS) *Until Something Moves. Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War.* This Estonian think tank's report reiterates: improving the issue of military mobility by improving the rail network for high-readiness forces, synergising civilian and military needs, reconciling investment financing in defence planning, necessary military exercises in the Baltic region and the problem of weak air and missile defence (AMD).

2021 (Jagiellonian Club) *The new strategic order. The transformation of the West and the security of Poland.* Polish experts point out, among other things, the need to adapt NATO and the EU, Poland's cooperation with Germany, the need to integrate the civilian and military dimensions of security (J. Gotkowska); long-term and cross-party planning and the development of regional security formats (P. Żurawski vel Grajewski); obtaining a regional deterrence capability (S. Dębski), expanding non-military fields of cooperation – political culture, universities, the Eastern Partnership (A. Traczyk), building the “Three Seas system” and pragmatically developing our own capabilities, as the allies will not do it for Poland (M. Budzisz).

2021 (DGAP) *Russia's Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region.* German experts describe the Russian strategy as a mix of offensive and defensive factors. Russia is characterised by (1) authoritarianism, (2) a belief in exceptionalism, (3) a sense of encirclement, and (4) treating security as a zero-sum game – and thus recognising that increasing the security of other countries cannot come at the expense of Russia's security. The authors analyse the Zapad manoeuvres and assess the development of NATO capabilities after 2014 (documents, procedures, commands, units). The report concludes with recommendations for NATO (strengthen AMD, adjust NRF, improve military mobility, establish a response to Russian medium-range missiles) and for Germany (clarify Russian policy objectives to the public and elites, bring about a fair burden of armaments costs, rebuild the Bundeswehr's capabilities – spending has increased by 40% since 2014).

2022 (CSIS) *NATO's Framework Nations Concept Beyond Madrid.* The report suggests that each country take on the tasks for which it is best suited. Using the JEF format as an example, the authors explain the need for greater accountability of framework nations (Framework Nation Concept), which would strengthen local leadership roles in the Alliance.

2022 (CSBA) *Deterrence and Defense in the Baltic Region. New Realities.* The report points to the need for an increase in defence spending in the Baltic region to around 3% of GDP, the implementation of multi-level reserve mobilisation plans, more precision weapons, joint purchases of AMD, expansion of unmanned ISR platforms and infrastructure development. It is necessary to allocate larger NATO forces to the MND-NE and MND-N commands. The report notes the weakness of Russian army in Ukraine: inefficient logistics, lack of combined command, weakness of aviation, low effectiveness of precision weapons.

Sources: see the bibliography of this report, which includes the above papers and many others.

DIRECTIVES FOR POLICY RESULTING FROM HISTORY

The security of the state is a result of its international position. In turn, the position depends on its tangible (territory, raw materials, demographics) and intangible (culture, ideas, norms, knowledge, image) resources. The greater the wealth of a country, the greater the military and economic potential. And the greater the military and economic potential – the higher the level of security.

In history, Poland has occupied various positions in the international system. Building Poland's power in the Middle Ages took more than a century – conventionally from Casimir the Great to Casimir the Jagiellonian. Thereafter, Poland was a European power for two hundred years – conventionally from the Peace of Thorn (1466) to the Truce of Andrusovo (1667). King Jan III Sobieski's attempts at reform were blocked by the Polish nobility. One hundred years after the king's death (1696–1795), an internally fractured Poland was occupied by its neighbours. For more than another hundred years, the Polish lands belonged to neighbouring empires, which collapsed after World War I. Then – about another hundred years, until today – Poland has survived various systems of government: democracy, authoritarianism, Nazi occupation, Stalinism, real socialism, and then liberal democracy. Polish history is a history of falls and rebirths.

Poland's functions in Europe and its international environment have also been changing. For hundreds of years, the main threat to Poland existed in the south (Turkey, the Habsburgs) and in the north (the Teutonic Knights, Sweden). The threat from the East did not appear until the time of Peter the Great, and the threat from the West is an even shorter period of our history. For hundreds of years, the divided and weak German and East Slavic states posed no existential threat to Poland.

The state is a political structure of long duration. Over the long term, the state myths, customs and norms of a culture are formed. The lack of existential threats in the Jagiellonian era led to the development of Sarmatian court culture in the 17th century, which is still a reference point for contemporary Polish culture. At the same time, the Polish political imagination of the last three hundred years is filled with images of defeat, sacrifice and violence. Several state collapses during this period (the collapse of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, uprisings, the collapse of the Second Republic, the collapse of the underground state, the bankruptcy of the communist Polish People's Republic) left lasting traces in Polish culture, which are emotionality, unwillingness to reflect and plan, distrust of the Other and self-centredness (Zybala, 2021). People working for the common good in Poland were not rewarded for this, but often died in wars and uprisings.

The lack of influence of the majority of the population on the immediate environment for generations has led to widespread scepticism about the institutions of the state. The state's ability to provide security has not been experienced for hundreds of years. In recent decades, the region's position has changed, and Poland has been able to benefit from the 20th century's political innovations of Western integrative organisations. According to some economists, Poland now has arguably the most favourable situation in several hundred years and faces the chance to avoid another drama (Piątkowski, 2013). Russia's sudden attack on Ukraine and attempts to change the European order, which is favourable to Poland, require what is disliked in our culture – reflection and planning.

In recent decades, there have been relatively few studies on Poland's position in Europe. Exceptions include works by Przemysław Grudziński (2008), Roman Kuźniar (2009), Adam Balcer and Kazimierz Wóycicki (2014), Ryszard Zięba and Justyna Zajac (2010), Piotr Grochmański (2021), Justyna Gotkowska, Przemysław Żurawski and Grajewski and others. (Nowy strategiczny ład [New Strategic Order], 2021). Over the past two decades, there have also been foresight studies, and the Polish state has adopted several national security (2003, 2007, 2014, 2020) and development (2006, 2012, 2013, 2017) strategies. In the past decade, Poland has also

had foreign policy strategies (2012-2016 and 2017-2021). The aim of this report is to try to collect data on the resources and activities that make up the country's position and thus affect its security.

The Polish school of economic history (W. Kula, M. Małowist, J. Topolski, A. Wyczanski) for successive post-war decades studied the reasons for the weakness of the countries of the Central and Eastern European region, which had already succumbed to its stronger neighbours in the modern period (Kievan Ruthenia fell back in the 13th century, Serbia and Bulgaria fell at the end of the 14th century, Hungary in the 16th century, the Bohemia in the 17th century, the fall of Poland was the latest in the region, but it also had the greatest consequences for the order in Europe). Regional weaknesses historians have cited include weak cities, low population density, weaker levels of education and technology, late development of capitalism, provincialism of the elites, and ossified social structures. For centuries, roles in the region were distributed by kings, then empires, and later the USSR (Chirot, 1991).

Today, Poland is not fighting for survival, but for specialisation in the international system. Survival alone is not enough. Poland needs a sustained international role and its recognition by the international community. The collapse of the USSR and Russia's loss of several centuries of dominance in the region created a "window of opportunity" that was wisely used to join the strongest military alliance and major economic bloc in Europe (see scenarios in Zięba, Zając, 2010). After decades of fruitful membership in the political structures of the West, Poland's economic potential has increased. Opportunities have arisen to change the state's long-standing position in the European system.

This section will present and analyse: (1) Poland's historical functions in the international system, (2) directives for Polish policy from the body of international policy research, and (3) directives from the dispute of Polish elites in the last decade.

Poland today is a medium-sized country. In an excellent monograph published in 2008, Ambassador Przemysław Grudziński described the features of the policy of medium-sized states in this way (see table below).

MEDIUM-SIZED STATE ATTRIBUTES:

- The role of regional leadership
- Initiatives in functional areas (economy, standards, law)
- Stabilising role (separation of states, balancing, neutralisation, mediation)
- Passive and negative roles (freeloading, sitting around, status seeking)

ANALOGIES IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES:

- Low level of participation in matters of global importance
- Interest in a limited range of issues
- Navigating the scale of the immediate geographic region
- Emphasis on diplomatic and economic instruments
- Emphasising international principles, international law, morality
- Striving for multilateral agreements
- Selection of neutral options
- Relying on superpowers to defend independence
- Striving to cooperate and avoid conflict
- Use of multiple resources to ensure political and physical survival

Source: P. Grudziński, Państwo inteligentne, Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli [The smart state. Poland in search of an international role], Toruń 2008, p. 61.

Skilful choice of international role allows the state to maintain beneficial functions in the system. Not everyone succeeds: Germany has lost several wars, Serbia has squandered Yugoslavia's relative successes, and Spain and Italy regularly lose due to the instability of their political systems. On the other hand, however, peripherally located and demographically small countries such as Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, and Norway have succeeded globally by developing specialties that are attractive to the international system as a whole. All of these countries have relied on new technologies, extensive cooperation, political integration with their neighbours, and elite education. This has allowed them to take advantage of the process of tertialisation (the rise of knowledge and services in the economy) to gain valuable international roles – and be partners for the superpowers. Meanwhile, Poland's position over the years has been problematic and has failed to ensure the security of the state and the nation. Cf. the table below.

POLAND IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE PAST

POLAND IN THE VIENNA SYSTEM (1815–1918)	POLAND IN THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM (1918–1945)
<p>MODUS OPERANDI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New model of the balance of power – the concert of powers • Guaranteeing the security of the superpowers • Colonial expansion, peace in Europe • Rule of law, legitimism, restoration • Control of change by the system of superpowers • Stabilisation of the system by diplomatic congresses 	<p>MODUS OPERANDI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict of the rules of the game – Wilsonian principles v balance of power • Weakness of democracy, rise of dictatorships and revisionism • Revolutions and progressive ideologisation • Use of threats of force, territorial annexations • Diplomacy based on blackmail and propaganda • Militarisation of foreign policy • Ignoring and trampling on the interests of small and medium-sized countries • Ignoring international norms and law
<p>EUROPEAN SECURITY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The European system par excellence • Colonial system separate from European system of states • Protecting the security of some small states • Division and absorption of small states in the unification process of Germany and Italy • The formation of modern nations in Eastern Europe • Troublesome actors – Poland and Turkey, Poland issue eases Prussian–Russian conflict • Interventions of the superpowers against attempts to overturn the status quo (Poland, Belgium, Hungary) • Germany's growing power shattering the concert, threatening Russia, threatening the UK • Rapid progress in the industrial revolution • Brutalising occupation of small countries 	<p>EUROPEAN SECURITY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • American isolationism and Soviet Russia's withdrawal from Europe • Aggressive German revisionism • Different levels and guarantees of security in the west and east of Europe • Strong regional antagonisms in the south and east of Europe • Lack of permanent micro and macro stability • Coalition rivalry, Entente exhaustion • Continuation of the colonial system • Democratic states unprepared for new war and defence of the system • Evolution and decay of the system prejudged by European countries

THE ROLE OF POLAND IN THE SYSTEM <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Poland as an „invisible state” – continuity of the idea of Poland• The role of Poland as a „gun” (an incident on Polish soil may trigger a conflict between the superpowers)• The high cost of occupation did not prove too much for the superpowers• Enforced function of the status quo base of Russia, Austria and Prussia• The function of recalling Poland’s liberal and libertarian role – challenges for monarchism• Poland – a factor undermining the rationality of the European system of states in the 19th century	THE ROLE OF POLAND IN THE SYSTEM <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Poland as a beneficiary of the simultaneous defeat of the three powers• Buffer function, prejudging the role of geopolitics amid erosion of liberal norms• Fiasco of the attempt to gain lasting advantage over Russia and reorganise CEE• Ambivalence towards the status quo• Limited and unprofitable revisionism.• Authoritarian regime as a limiting factor for alliances• Declining relative military strength and lack of concept for army modernisation• Economic weakness• Rhetoric of a large state not based on objective grounds.• The evolution of Poland’s role from a state returning to the stage to a state struggling to survive
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Source: P. Grudziński, Państwo inteligentne, Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli [The smart state. Poland in search of an international role], Toruń 2008, p. 61.

POLAND IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER 1989

MODUS OPERANDI	EUROPEAN SECURITY	THE ROLE OF POLAND IN THE SYSTEM
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From momentary global consensus to differing visions and conflicting rules of the game of the superpowers US political-military dominance, but also the emergence of blocs and zones of instability Attempts to turn U.S. hegemony into a permanent imperial system Establishment of zones of influence - rationalisation of control Transformation of state systems as a US "mission" Global expansion of democracy and the market economy No chance for new global institutions UN weakness Conflict between multilateralism and bilateralism Redefinition of Westphalian-type sovereignty The importance of non-state actors (terrorism) Low standard of classical military competition Numerous internal and local conflicts Security collectivisation - protection of weak states, even if they are not in alliances Intrusive standards e.g. the responsibility to protect New global threats: terrorism, climate, water, pandemics, weak states, migration, corruption An explosion in the number of small states, Ineffectiveness of "state-building" policies in Asia Regional stabilisation, e.g., in the U., Europe, Asia The growing role of China and India Russia undermining the status quo in international relations Potential nuclearisation in zones of instability The next wave of neo-colonialism The West rejected as a cultural reference point 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutionalised concert of new type instead of the balance of power Integrating the buffer zone of Central Europe into the European security system The European empire operates on the principle of active integration and neighbourhood policy Compensation to Russia - NATO-Russia Council, G8 et al. Integration as a method of conflict mediation EU membership as a symbolic guarantee of security EU scepticism towards the US Complicated EU-NATO relations USA still linked to Europe's defence The return of Russia as a rival to the West The evolution of NATO: from collective defence to collective security Europe - a strategy for effective multilateralism Conflicting security interests of the EU and its members Weakness of European military capabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evolution from a weak post-imperial state to a member of the Euro-Atlantic structures The function of a new and cooperative member of the club. Exporting stability and democracy The function of stabilising the region in the face of the collapse of the USSR The liberal formula for transformation Accelerator of NATO and European integration Strategic reconciliation with Germany, ambivalent relations with Russia, growing importance of the US Poland as an ally of the US, Poland's disputes with European partners Poland as an inspiration for Western policy towards Ukraine Poland as the model of a successful transition state

Source: compiled from: P. Grudziński, Państwo inteligentne, Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli [The smart state. Poland in search of an international role], Toruń 2008, p. 129-131.

For hundreds of years, the security of states was based on diplomacy and military force. In the long term, however, the basic resource necessary for survival has become the economy. It has also stopped being about mere survival. Contemporary security studies also emphasise issues of the status of the state and the quality of life of the population. As Grudziński wrote, today foreign policy does not determine the fate of states in the same way as in the 19th century (Grudzinski, 2008). A broader approach is important – economics, society, quality of governance, maturity of elites, political culture, fitting in with global trends – these are increasingly important factors in growing the power of states. Contemporary security studies therefore speak of economic, social, energy and cultural security. In each of these areas, countries are rated and compared (see table titled *Poland's position in the global security rankings*, below).

Poland has historically lost through a lack of proper resources and institutions, sometimes leading decision-makers to misguided strategies (attempts to balance neighbouring powers instead of bandwagoning strategies; reluctance to change strategies and modernise the army; reluctance to develop; lack of an idea to overcome peripherality; disbelief in long-term relationships). For example, in the interwar period, Poland and Italy considered themselves superpowers, but did not have the economic resources to realise the roles of such superpowers. As a result, both states collapsed and their roles in the international system were imposed on them by other powers.

Today, even the strongest states cannot ensure economic security, control the development of technology, or the circulation of information. The key has become knowledge and relationships, which require significant intellectual competence from state cadres. This is especially true for medium-sized countries that do not have the material resources necessary to compete at the level of superpowers. Poland is precisely a medium-sized state, and the primary roles of medium-sized states are to be mediators, intermediaries and local leaders (Balcer, Wóycicki, 2014). Currently, the institutional arrangements adopted in Europe are favourable for Poland to carry out such roles. Among advanced industrial democracies, a stable form of inter-state politics has emerged, based on credible expectations of peaceful change, domestic rule of law, stable international institutions, and intense social interaction. **A revised post-Westphalian order based on the principles of shared sovereignty, multilateralism, consensualism and cohesion policy, which correct the old mechanisms of arbitrary domination by the superpowers, is more beneficial for Poland than a return to the geopolitical rules of the old days, in which the law of the strongest prevailed.** This system has also ensured peace in Western Europe for several decades. Peace is a silent ally of small and medium-sized countries. All of the aforementioned countries that have succeeded and gained the expected status in international politics have stayed away from armed conflict.

PROCESS

DIRECTIVE FOR POLAND

Medium-sized and large states **tend to fall for internal reasons** (e.g., Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, the Commonwealth of Two Nations). External causes are the result



To tend the **quality of the state's internal institutions**

Small and medium-sized **countries succeed with long-term peace** (Sweden, Switzerland)



To work for **peace in Europe**

The status of states is based on their international roles. Roles are based on functions in the system of states.



To develop **useful and recognised functions in the system**. Not to become the subject of games.

Medium-sized states are active especially in the area of their **direct regional interests**



A Poland that is **not embedded in Europe will not play a role either in Europe or vis-à-vis Russia**

Small and medium-sized countries **have gained from the development of modern technologies**



To nurture the **development of education and support R&D**

The capabilities of small and medium-sized countries are their **own and those acquired from outside: allied**



Expand its **own military and economic resources**. Not to neglect alliances

POLAND'S POSITION IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY RANKINGS

RANK	POLISH POSITION	APPRAISAL
Security Threats Index (2022)	Poland ranks 160th in the world in terms of threats to the population (out of 177 countries). A score of 2.1 on a scale of 1-10, where 1 indicates low risk and 10 indicates high risk.	Poland is among the world's 20 safest countries for population. This indicator assesses the risk of terrorism, insurgency, bombings, the impact of organised crime on state structures, etc. The aforementioned threats are unlikely in Poland.
Fragile States Index (2022)	Poland ranks 146th in the world in terms of fragility of state structures (out of 177 countries). A score of 42.2 on a scale of 0-120.	Poland ranks about 30th in the world in terms of stability of state structures (but around 40th in terms of elite conflict and around 50th in terms of government legitimacy).
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2022)	Poland ranks 14th out of 137 countries, with a score of 7.93 on a scale of 1-10.	The BTI examines the quality of the democratic transition and includes 3 smaller indicators. Poland ranks 10th in the area of economic transformation, 24th in the area of political transformation, but only 47th in the area of governance quality (only Serbia, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina are rated lower than Poland in the region).
Freedom in the World (2022)	In the civil liberties ranking, Poland scores 82/100. Democracy's quality ranking was much lower, at 59/100 (in 2017 the score was 74/100, and in 2015: 80/100).	Poland is a country where civil rights (34/40 points) and civic freedoms (47/60 points) are generally respected. In the second ranking, there is a noticeable decline in the quality of political institutions. In 2020, Poland lost its status as a "consolidated democracy" to a "partially consolidated democracy."
Corruption Perception Index (2021)	Poland ranks 42nd out of 180 countries, with a score of 56/100.	This ranking is on the scale of corruption in the public sector. Poland performs averagely on the European scale, but well on the regional scale (only Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia are ahead of Poland). The highest position was achieved by Poland in 2015, it was in 29th place with a score of 63/100. Before joining the EU, Poland was ranked around 65th.
Global Firepower (2022)	Poland ranks 24th out of 142 countries, which is similar to the G-20 in economic rankings.	Poland's military position is stable and corresponds to the country's economic position. Ukraine advanced ahead of Poland. Behind Poland is Sweden. The region's other major country, Romania, is ranked 38th.
Global Militarization Index (2019)	Poland ranked 68th out of 155 countries, indicating a rather low level of militarisation of society.	The index measures the ratio of a country's population to its (1) military expenditures, (2) number of military personnel, and (3) number of weapons units owned. Ukraine is ranked 22, France is ranked 60, and Germany is ranked 97.
Cato Arms Sales Risk Index (2021)	Poland reaches a rate of 17, which is on par with other large NATO countries (Germany 13, France 19, Romania 24).	The ASRI ranking identifies 4 risks (corruption, instability, human rights, conflict) to US military support of a selected country. The higher the risks, the lower the chance of selling arms to such a country.
Global Health Security (2021)	Poland ranks 29th out of 185 countries with a score of 55.7. Poland's position has improved since 2019.	Poland's position is good compared to Europe (higher than Italy, Greece, or Romania), but there is a long way to go for leadership positions. The report on the state of health care is more than 100 pages long.
Global Food Security (2022)	Poland is ranked 21st out of 113 countries.	Poland's performance is good compared to the world, but uneven. Among the sub-assessments, Poland has: 27th in food availability, 35th in production, 15th in food quality, and 17th in vulnerability to climate change.
Global Cybersecurity Index (2020)	Poland's cybersecurity ranking is 30th out of 182 countries, with a score of 93.86 out of 100.	Poland's position is good compared to other Western countries. Poland is only a few points behind the world's top five. Estonia (ranked 3rd) and Latvia (ranked 15th) were ranked highly.
WEC Energy Trilemma Index Tool (2021)	Poland ranks 30th out of 101 countries in terms of energy security.	The index ranks countries on their ability to deliver sustainable energy along 3 dimensions: (1) energy security, (2) energy equity (availability and affordability), and (3) environmental sustainability. In 2021, Poland had ratings: B, B, C. No area received an A grade. The Scandinavian countries score best.

Sources: own compilation based on the websites of the institutions listed.

DIRECTIVES FOR POLICY RESULTING FROM THEORY

The issue of external state security has been considered in academia mainly in the analysis of international relations. The problem with this strand of knowledge stems from the fact that it developed in the 20th century in Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, UK) and its terminology mainly describes the actions of the superpowers. It is necessary to change this perspective and relate the existing categories to medium-sized and small countries.

In the 21st century, numerous research currents have emerged, advocating analytical eclecticism and pragmatism (Sil, Katzenstein, 2010). Using this perspective, attention should be paid to the ability to solve specific problems. If a particular concept does not help solve the problem, then we look for another one. We also recognise that concepts are more important than theories (e.g., the concept of hegemony will be found in the theories of realism and Marxism, as well as liberalism), so we try to simplify them enough to keep their common denominator and possible raw, analytical meaning to serve the purpose of explaining the problem. Thus, in the ancient dispute between analysis and narration, we favour the former (Bartoś, 2020).

Below is a table in which: (1) the main concepts of international relations research, (2) their explanations, and (3) the directives suggested based on them for Poland's security policy.

CONCEPT	EXPLANATION	DIRECTIVES FOR POLAND
BALANCE OF POWER This concept was mentioned in 1507 by the Florentine historian Bernardo Rucellai; the balance of power was mentioned in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht; it was later described by philosopher David Hume in 1752. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the balance of power was considered the main principle of European politics	According to David Hume, the balance of power is a mechanism for maintaining peace between states. For its maintenance, the development of diplomacy is essential. The balance of power system is based on the struggle or cooperation of states to prevent one state from dominating others. Usually states have 2 choices: balancing or joining the stronger (bandwagoning), as described by Q. Wright in his Study of War in 1942.	Directive for Poland: Remember that the balance of power serves peace, not conflict. One should be a participant, not an object in the debate. Loss of agency in foreign, defence and domestic policy should be avoided.
SOVEREIGNTY The word „sovereignty” was used by Jean Bodin in 1576 to describe the specifics of the modern French monarchy. The sovereignty of states was an important principle adopted in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648	Sovereignty describes a state's ability to exercise authority over its territory. With sovereignty (Fr. souverain), the authority itself can decide the scope of its action. It is nowadays recognised that the authority may delegate its certain powers to organisations and alliances acting on its behalf.	Directive for Poland: the medium-sized state should skilfully use sovereignty shared with others (e.g., in the EU) to gain support in the area of key state security interests.
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE A concept expressed, although not explicitly, in the so-called Monroe Doctrine in 1823; in a treaty between states, the term appeared in 1885 (British-German treaty concerning the division of colonial territories in Africa)	After World War I, the term lost its legal international significance and became a geopolitical idea. Nowadays, the concept of spheres of influence refers to informal mechanisms for exercising power over a given geographic space (today, including virtual space).	Directive for Poland: being in the sphere of influence means objectification. Such phrases should be avoided in official statements in favour of using others such as soft power (or, for example, national branding).
INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY The Greek word anarkhos means “lack of order”. The concept of international anarchy was introduced in 1926 by G. Lowes Dickinson. At the time, anarchy was believed to be the main cause of wars. The concept was popularised by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics in 1979.	Anarchy means that there is no overarching power in international politics to impose rules. In a situation of anarchy, there is no monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as in the internal politics of the state. Such a situation causes states to try to protect themselves (self-help). Anarchy does not preclude the existence of a hierarchy of states, and its effects can be partially neutralised by the development of peaceful norms.	Directive for Poland: a medium-sized country should engage in multilateral processes to influence large countries and their international agenda. It is necessary to minimise the effects of arbitrary aggressive states (such as Russia's attack on Ukraine).

<p>POLITICAL REALISM AND THE THEORY OF POLITICAL INTEREST</p> <p>A political tradition popularised by Edward Carr (1939) and Hans Morgenthau (1948) indicating that one should analyse the facts, causes and consequences of states' pursuit of power interests. Political interest has replaced the older idea of <i>raison d'état</i>.</p>	<p>Carr argued that foreign policy should be cross-party. Ideas and political thought can create events or prevent them from being seen (dreams cannot dominate over rational reflection, which is considered objective here). Morgenthau believed that the goal of politics should be the pursuit of state power. Therefore, politicians must recognise the interests of the state and act on them.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: The medium-sized state should be aware of its interests and clearly articulate them, for example, in strategies and policy projects. Care should be taken for possible inclusiveness (making other countries share our beliefs). It is necessary to ensure the awareness of the elite and the public of what power means today.</p>
<p>GEOSTRATEGY</p> <p>A concept associated with the tradition of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics (Mackinder, 1904 and 1919, Spykman, 1943) The term "geostrategy" was used in 1942 by Frederick Schuman translating the word <i>Wehrgeopolitik</i>, used by Gen. Karl Haushofer</p>	<p>State strategy of a doctrinal nature, assuming the influence of geographical factors on the military and political situation of the state or the region as a whole.</p> <p>Early concepts of geostrategy said, among other things, that the Eastern European region is crucial to the balance of power in Eurasia, as it allows expansion beyond Europe, as well as control of land trade.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: to gain a key geostrategic position in the Eastern European region, thanks to the development of road networks, railways and trade relations, both on the east-west and north-south axis. Take into account the military factor (ability to transport troops, security logistics, etc.).</p>
<p>POWER</p> <p>Hans Morgenthau's (1948) concept of power explains that the goal of a country's foreign policy is the pursuit of power. In 2001, John Mearsheimer supplemented this theory with the claim that states seek to maximise power (so-called offensive realism).</p>	<p>Power is the strength of a state understood as capabilities or relationships. The components of power are: 1) geography, 2) natural resources (food, raw materials), 3) industry, 4) combat readiness (technology, number and quality of forces, leadership), 5) population (distribution, demographics), 6) national character, 7) national morale (quality of society and government), 8) quality of diplomacy, 9) and government (balance of resources, support). Moreover, power is the ability to influence minds.</p> <p>Morgenthau believed that power has 3 pursuits to which 3 types of politics correspond: (1) maintenance of power (status quo), (2.) expansion of power (imperialism), (3.) manifestation of power (prestige politics).</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: The medium-sized state should consciously strive to develop traditional power factors by clearly defining political interests in every area. These should be supplemented with new power factors (science, innovation, attractiveness of the country, allies). The parallel policies of neighbours in this regard should also be observed.</p>
<p>SECURITY DILEMMA</p> <p>John Herz's (1950) concept of the security dilemma is the political science equivalent of the „prisoner's dilemma“</p>	<p>The security dilemma implies that the militarisation of a country's policies can lead to concerns in its neighbours. The result could be an arms race. The Cold War period and the rivalry between the US and the USSR is given as an example. The security dilemma is tied to the balance of power.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: the militarisation of Russia's policy requires a firm response within Poland's own and allied strategies. The development of defence capabilities should be planned rationally.</p>

<p>SECURITY COMMUNITY</p> <p>Karl Deutsch's (1957) idea of a security community enumerates a dozen requirements necessary to build (or destroy!) a security community in the region.</p>	<p>The theory defines the conditions necessary for the formation of a security community. These are: 1. Mutual compatibility of values, 2. Generation of a distinct way of life, 3. Expectations of closer economic integration, 4. A marked increase in the political and administrative capacity of the participants, 5. Higher economic growth in several participants, 6. Unbroken lines of social communication, 7. Expansion of political elites, 8. Movement of people between politically significant strata, 9. Multiple scopes of communication and transactions.</p> <p>Factors in the disintegration of security communities are: 1. Imposing too heavy a military burden, 2. A marked increase in the participation of passive social groups or strata and regions, 3. Activation of political participation as a result of increased ethnic/linguistic diversity, 4. Prolonged economic stagnation or recession, 5. Relative closure of the existing political elite (formation of frustrated counter-elites among marginalised groups, 6. Continued postponement of expected reforms – especially those already implemented in neighbouring countries.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: The medium-sized country should take measures to sustain and increase the quality of the security community (NATO), especially in the period of a crisis of legitimacy in the „old NATO“ countries. This needs joint security communication initiatives, perceptions of adversaries and their norms, and neutralisation of international disinformation through our own and allied strategic communication systems.</p>
<p>DEPENDENCY</p> <p>Dependency theory was formulated by Raul Prebisch (1950), for describing the relationship between metropolises and colonies. The development of the theory was continued by Andre Gunder Frank during the Cold War.</p>	<p>International dependency reposes in the fact that wealthy countries sustain poverty in poor countries by forcing the production of cheap goods, while advanced and profitable production remains in rich countries. Catching up with wealthy countries by copying their institutions is impossible.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: Poland should rely on cooperation with partners providing opportunities for interdependent development and technology transfer (EU, US, South Korea, others). One should be a partner, not just a customer. This requires strengthening economic diplomacy.</p>
<p>PEACE</p> <p>Johan Galtung's (1969) peace theory led to the creation of an entire discipline – peace research, combining military science, psychology, management and politics.</p>	<p>According to Galtung, peace is „the persistence of social values or goals“. Peace is a response to violence of two kinds. Personal violence is direct in nature. Eliminating it brings negative peace (no violence). Structural violence is indirect and means, for example, injustice or exploitation. Eliminating such violence brings positive peace (e.g., justice, social cohesion).</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: it is in the interest of the medium-sized state to take care of the structural security of peace in the region (NATO and the EU) and avoid the discourse of differentiation of allied states (e.g., „multi-speed Europe“, but also a „Europe of homelands“), which draws attention to separateness, injustice, conflict, structural violence, foreign norms, etc.</p>
<p>DETERRENCE</p> <p>The word deterrence comes from the Latin verb <i>deterreō</i> (to frighten, discourage). The most popular concept of deterrence on the ground of strategic studies comes from the works of Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling (The Strategy of Conflict from 1960 and later). Deterrence theory has enjoyed enduring popularity in NATO since the Cold War.</p>	<p>Deterrence involves convincing an opponent that the cost or risk of taking an action will outweigh the benefits they could receive as a result. Deterrence is a type of coercion. Coercion itself, according to Schelling, can take the form of deterrence or coercion (compellence). Compellence is designed to cause a given behaviour, while deterrence is designed to dissuade it. Deterrence is thus defensive and coercion is offensive. Deterrence is a behavioural strategy (preservation), and coercion is a change strategy (change).</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: one of the goals of Poland's security policy is to deter Russia and prevent it from recreating a European concert of powers dating back to the 19th century. To this end, we should use our own tools (development of sustainable armed forces, diplomacy) and those of allies (cooperation with the powers and states of the region), e.g. the creation of a „coalition of the willing“ to invest in the defence of Eastern Europe.</p>
<p>INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM</p> <p>Morton Kaplan's (1957) concept of the international system says that states form systems of relations, such as the balance of power or the two-bloc system. This idea was developed by Kenneth Waltz in 1979</p>	<p>Morton Kaplan introduced systems analysis to the study of international politics. A system is an arrangement of relationships between elements. It is from Kaplan's work that such terms as bipolar system, universal system, and hierarchical system are derived. On this basis, Waltz developed a theory of the structure of the system, in which states compete for status to ensure their security.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: necessary programming of relations with key partners determining the shape of the system and expanding its influence in the system. Participate in international subsystems (EU, NATO) to minimise the dangerous effects of anarchy (such as the law of the strongest).</p>

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS Concepts of the level of analysis of international relations in Kenneth Waltz (1959) and Joel David Singer (1961 and 1971)	According to Waltz, there are 3 perspectives of looking at international relations: (1) The human nature perspective – the struggle of leaders for dominance, (2) The perspective of state structures (parties, voters, ministries), and (3) The international system perspective, whose features are anarchy and self-help. Singer indicated the high utility of the systems approach. Both authors point out that the systemic level explains international politics better than the perspective of the politics of individual states, or the psyche of their leaders.	Directive for Poland: development of analytical and intelligence centres allowing observation of the international environment. Educate parliamentary (and other) elites on the issue.
PATH (DEPENDENCE) The systems model developed by J. David Singer, which recognises the impact of complexity on living systems. Human societies are not automatons; they depend on their history and experiences.	Singer distinguishes 2 system schools: system-action and system-being. In the first school, systems are identified around the „actions, behaviours, interactions, relationships or roles” of states, largely ignoring individuals. The second type system is a correction of the first, which recognises the ability of people to learn from their own and others’ experiences (path dependence).	Directive for Poland: what is needed is to be aware of one's potential and to discover one's strengths in recent history, and to take care to build coherent tools for communicating this. The story of the development of people, culture, cities, regions, and infrastructure, should be a story with pragmatic use of the perspective of the past and the future.
CENTRE AND PERIPHERY Immanuel Wallerstein's (1974) system-world theory says, among other things, that the world is divided into economic centres, semi-peripheries and peripheries, as reflected in trade relations, production chains, and the distribution of production around the world.	Wallerstein transferred Prebisch's ideas to the analysis of entire economies. Since the 16th century, Eastern Europe has been an economic periphery, which is still trying to overcome the backwardness that resulted from the late development of states and capitalism in these lands. Peripherality can be overcome through: (1) autarky, (2) invitation, or (3) chance / window of opportunity.	Directive for Poland: to strive for the centre of the world economy through the development of technology and new tools of power. It is possible to take advantage of the development opportunity provided by access to the EU market and security, thanks to NATO membership.
IMPERIALISM Independent of Wallerstein's work, Galtung developed his own centre-periphery theory in his work on the structural theory of imperialism (1971).	Galtung described the process of imperialism as a relationship between elites of states. The elites of the metropolis seek to curry favour with the elites of the periphery to advance the interests of the metropolis. Imperialism is a relationship such that: 1) there is a convergence of interests between the centre of the centre state and the centre of the periphery state; 2) there is a greater divergence within the periphery state than in the centre state, and 3) there is a divergence of interests between the periphery of the two states.	Directive for Poland: avoid engaging in cooperation with states or political groups that preach revisionist ideas that threaten peace. Authoritarian states also have their soft power, tempting with ideals of community, collectivism, historical justice and traditional values. This also applies to the training of key people in the state for resistance to infiltration activities.
POLITICAL INTEGRATION After World War II, the writings of functionalists David Mitrany and Ernst Haas contributed to the understanding of state cooperation and the establishment of international agencies and organisations as an opportunity to reduce wars.	Integration is best understood as a process. It includes (1) the move toward increased cooperation among states; (2) the gradual transfer of power to supranational institutions; (3) the gradual homogenisation of values; and (4) the emergence of a global civil society, and with it the building of new forms of political community.	Directive for Poland: it is necessary to study the effectiveness of integration processes in various sectors, to determine its own potential, and to develop viable integration initiatives in the region (roadmaps for action, working groups). A good model is the Nordic countries.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY Hedley Bull's (1977) concept of the international community describes what values and institutions strengthen cooperation among states and create common norms, such as international law. Many researchers, for example, consider the transatlantic community as an example of international community	An international community is formed among states sharing common interests, values, institutions, mechanisms of diplomacy and customs in a situation of war. The values of the community of states are: maintaining and protecting the community of states, preserving the external sovereignty of states, peace, and taking care of the goals of social life – 1) curbing violence, 2) upholding contracts and 3) respecting property rights.	Directive for Poland: it is important for the medium-sized state to actively co-create the agenda of the West through broad participation in international co-operation institutions, treated as a tool for gaining information and influencing the international environment.

<p>COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE</p> <p>Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's (1977) steadily developing concept of complex interdependence explains why states can cooperate, despite conflicting interests.</p>	<p>Relationships between states are based on transactions and create networks of different problems, where there is no apparent hierarchy. Countries create case agendas (agenda setting) and linkages. At the same time, they know that conflicts are possible and are simultaneously building their short-term resilience (sensitivity) and long-term resilience (vulnerability) in the face of war, threats and blackmail, for example.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: a medium-sized country needs to be aware of the bundling of relations with each neighbour (security, development, communication); it is necessary to have a proactive agenda in each relationship and to realise that long-term international cooperation exists for decades regardless of the will of local politicians.</p>
<p>HEGEMONIC CYCLES</p> <p>The concept of hegemonic cycles was introduced by American scholar of Polish descent George Modelski (1978) based on Joseph Schumpeter's 1939 work on business cycles. Modelski described the process of the rise and fall of global hegemony, starting in the 15th-16th centuries.</p>	<p>The idea of hegemonic cycles says that there is always some dominant state / hegemon in the world. Changes in hegemony are cyclical, the hegemons were countries such as Portugal, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Periods of hegemony are expected to last 60-90 years, and hegemonic wars about 20 years. To date, none of the rivals has replaced the hegemon (France has not defeated England, neither has Germany, the USSR did not defeat the US). The role of the leading power was usually taken over by a third country, which was the main ally of the hegemon (for example, the US replaced the UK).</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: the Polish state should systematically analyse the development trends of the leading countries of the globe (G-20) in terms of innovation, key companies, cultural figures, investors, etc.</p>
<p>HEGEMONY</p> <p>Based on Modelski's earlier work are the concepts of hegemony by Robert Gilpin (1981) and hegemonic stability by Robert Keohane (1984)</p>	<p>These concepts say that the world is ruled by hegemonies who, during their domination, build coalitions of support and maintain an international order that favours their interests. Hegemony continues as long as other countries prefer to join (bandwagoning) such a system, rather than balancing (balancing) the dominant state.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: it is worth linking (though not equating) the interests of the medium-sized state with those of the dominant state by building regional partnerships. Poland may seek to be a „framework state” of NATO's eastern region.</p>
<p>THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE STATE</p> <p>Formulated in a comprehensive essay in 1970, Kalevi Holsti's role theory greatly influenced the development of foreign policy analysis (FPA)</p>	<p>Concepts of international roles say that states have various roles in the international system (defender of order, revisionist state, broker, security node, etc.). The roles held sometimes differ from those declared. Central to the effectiveness of state roles is an appropriate self-perception.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: The medium-sized state should define its roles as precisely as possible and strive to fulfil them. There is a need for increased training of cadres for the role (promoting Polish soldiers in NATO; Polish officials in the EU) and an increase in the amount of resources for state priorities.</p>
<p>ALLIANCE</p> <p>Stephen Walt's theory of alliances (1987) explains, among other things, why smaller states build alliances or join a stronger one (e.g., Belarus to Russia)</p>	<p>Alliances are formed either as a balancing / states balance (ally with others against a threatening one) or as a result of joining (bandwagoning), when countries join forces with, for example, a major threat.</p> <p>Stephen Walt believes that it is better to ally with the weaker, as this increases the influence of the weaker (e.g., joining the stronger usually reduces the role of the state). For example, Germany is more likely to agree to closer cooperation with the Czech Republic than with Poland.</p> <p>Factors affecting the threat level of states: 1) aggregate power, 2) geographic proximity, 3) offensive capabilities, 4) offensive intentions.</p>	<p>Directive for Poland: Joining NATO is a more effective method of securing the state against Russia than trying to balance Russia or submit to Moscow on its own.</p> <p>Moreover, bandwagoning is a more effective strategy than, for example, appeasement. Consciously joining friendly strong states ensures better development outcomes. In this sense, Czech and Polish cooperation with Germany is better than with Russia.</p>

INTERNATIONAL REGIME The concept of regimes was proposed by J. Ruggie (1975) and developed by S. Krasner (1983). It explains the formation of treaties, rules, norms and decision-making procedures in international politics.	Countries also join regimes for selfish reasons to reduce risks and transaction costs. Other reasons include political power (in service of the common good or vested interests), norms and rules, usus (regular patterns of behaviour based on practice) and custom (long-standing practice). The reason is usually the knowledge that a given behaviour pays off.	Directive for Poland: international regimes should be treated as mechanisms to support smaller states by binding and limiting the spectrum of decisions of larger states, rather than as a threat to sovereignty.
REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX Regional security complex theory was developed by Barry Buzan and colleagues (1983 and 2003)	Most problems and threats are regional in nature. Countries are also interdependent in the area of security. Regional security complex means that regions have groups of countries that share common security interests (e.g., the B9 Group)	Directive for Poland: it is useful to work on the development and institutionalisation of regional security cooperation, since most contacts (and also conflicts!) are regional in nature.
DEMOCRATIC PEACE Michael Doyle's (1983) concept of democratic peace refers to Immanuel Kant's (1795) idea of perpetual peace and triumphed in the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR.	The concept states that democratic states are more stable and based on politicians' accountability to voters. As a result, democracies do not fight as many wars with each other as authoritarianisms do, hence the conclusion that the more democracies in the world, the greater the chance for peace. This idea is related to the concept of the Hegelian „goal of history" by Fukuyama, who argued that democracy is a system that provides more dignity to people than other systems.	Dyrektywa dla Polski: to take care of the development of decision-making processes appropriate to democracy in Poland and the former Eastern Bloc countries, which also includes educating the elite, promoting best practices and attracting local leaders from different countries. Supporting democratic opposition in authoritarian countries of the former USSR (asylum, scholarships, grants, think tanks).
SOFT POWER Published in 2004, the work Soft power. How to succeed in world politics is one of Joseph Nye's most important works.	Soft power is a state's ability to win allies and gain influence through the appeal of its own culture, policies or ideals. In his later work The Future of Power, Nye developed the idea of soft power into smart power.	Dyrektywa dla Polski: Thanks to Solidarity, Poland gained influence as an initiator of democratic change in Europe. It is worth sustaining a leadership role in this regard, as few countries can boast such a tradition of policy innovation.
KONSTRUKTYWIZM The concepts of Constructivism by Alexander Wendt (1987, 1995, 1999) and other authors say that politics is „constructed" by the ideas and norms people believe in. Changing ideas and norms leads to behavioural changes and then policy changes.	Constructivism in its early form assumed that the policies of states are based on beliefs (ideas, views, imagination, myths) that influence real actions and the material world. For example, Eastern Europe no longer believes in the unity of the Slavic peoples, and even a hundred years ago this was an important idea. Belief in the unity of the Ruthenian lands (as well as in the idea of a „clash of civilisations" and the Russian mission) led Russia to intellectual isolation, followed by war with Ukraine and huge losses.	Directive for Poland: Poland has the time and space to create a coherent and attractive story about our region. Ideas have consequences, but it is necessary to consciously and continuously assess which ones. The population and opinion leaders should also be made aware of the origin of various ideas.
SECURITISATION The theories of the Copenhagen School (1993-1998) are a development of the constructivist approach in the study of state security	In simple terms, the securitisation process means that threats are socially constructed in the media by elites. There has also been a broadening of the idea of security, which now includes not only military and political issues, but also „security sectors" like ecology, economics, energy, and society.	Directive for Poland: the state's security institutions (e.g., critical infrastructure, reserves, shelters, supplies) should be improved so that the state is not taken by surprise by non-military events (floods, refugees, storms, energy crises) and military events.

Sources: selected materials for further reading can be found in the bibliography at the end of the report.

The above table contains a summary of 30 key concepts developed in the 20th and 21st centuries for the study of state policies in international relations. The vast majority concern the phenomenon of power and security. The latest concepts also include newer ideas about elusive processes, such as *disinformation, strategic culture/communication, new threats (asymmetric, hybrid), state-building, vulnerable states* or numerous technical terms to describe the workings of the realities of integrative organisations such as NATO and the EU. The added value is the attempt to concisely translate these concepts into the language of the interests of the medium-sized state.

Poland as a middle state is a country building its position largely through successful interactions with its neighbours (formal and informal / movement of people, capital, goods) and through integration structures in the fields of the military, security, economic, and human rights. The medium-sized state gains status by using “windows of opportunity” to narrow the development gap to the leaders in particular fields of international relations.

The basic new resource of the modern medium-sized state is to have an educated population and the ability to absorb information and process it into its own pro-development strategies and actions. The same applies to security policy. Existing crises in the vicinity of Poland point to the need for institutional reforms and human resource development needed for ambitious policies in an environment of high uncertainty. It should be remembered that unlike typical party politics in a democracy (where random people often end up), in security policy, having specialists of world rank requires tending the personnel representing the state. Competing with the civil servant, intelligence and military cadres of allied (or enemy) countries requires a pool of high-value personnel and knowledge. Furthermore, the state must take care of the so-called institutional memory in key security areas.

DIRECTIVES FOR POLICY RESULTING FROM DISCOURSE

Over the past two decades, two visions of Polish security policy have been formed. The first is related to the liberal parties. The second is related to conservative parties. Despite the dispute, their goal remains common: to build a strong position for Poland in the region. Both parties understand the concept of the regional security complex, that is, the recognition that most threats to states come from their close proximity. The main threat to Poland and the entire Central and Eastern European (CEE) region is Russia's revisionist policies. In addition, liberals and conservatives differ in almost everything: ideas, priorities, partners, rhetoric, language and practice.

According to liberals, European cooperation is crucial for Polish security. European countries are Poland's main trade and technology partners, and the priority in liberal thinking is the economy. Liberals assume that Warsaw's strong economic and diplomatic position would allow it to play the role of one of Europe's leaders, which would also strengthen Poland's position vis-à-vis Russia. In the security sphere, this means closer military cooperation with NATO and EU countries and a high degree of openness to American initiatives. This was more or less the policy in the first half of the past decade (the liberals ruled Poland from 2007 to 2015). This policy resonated with major European partners and the Barack Obama administration in the US.

The thinking of the conservative parties is more geopolitical in nature. This mindset underscores the importance of traditional bilateral diplomacy. In this view, the priority is not economic relations, but political and military ones. Conservatives attach great importance to history education. Frequent references are made to the Jagiellonian era and Sarmatism, when Poland was a regional power. Today, the Conservatives' policy priority is the development of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. The United States remains an important reference point. The Polish government is trying to win the favour of its neighbours through various geopolitical projects, such as the TSI (Three Seas Initiative) in the economic sphere and the B9 (Bucharest Nine) in the security sphere. These projects are intended to communicate the emergence of a space of regional consensus; to create the impression of an increase in the stature of the entire region. The success of these agreements could reinforce Poland's diplomatic strength as a beneficiary of change in Europe and the largest CEE country.

The table below shows a summary of 20 different views of Polish elites on foreign and security policy issues. The compilation was based on a discourse analysis conducted in 2022.

Rationale / Justification of Poland's Policy	Policy #1 Conservatism	Policy #2 Liberalism
R1 The CEE region thanks to Poland can create a new centre of power	x	
R2 A return to geopolitical initiatives is needed	x	
R3 Russia should be deterred and US support should be enlisted	x	x
R4 Poland can lead the region	x	x
R5 Germany and Russia are Poland's rivals in the CEE region	x	
R6 Emphasising assertiveness and sovereignty is important	x	
R7 There is an opportunity for strong Polish soft power in the post-Soviet region		x
R8 Poland should co-govern Europe together with Germany and France		x
R9 Poland is more important to Europe than Russia.		x
R10 If the US helps Poland, it will strengthen its leadership in NATO	x	
R11 Poland should develop the Eastern Partnership and a democratic civilisation alternative against Russia		x
R12 Poland should develop the TSI and B9 projects	x	
R13 Poland's position is determined, in particular, by military strength and moral reasons	x	
R14 Rather, Poland's position is determined by economic potential, technology and alliances		x
R15 Poland should enter the G20 in place of Russia	x	x
R16 Poland cannot count on the help of Germany and France against Russia.	x	
R17 Poland should work closely with the EU to strengthen its position in the West and balance the larger European countries		x
R18 Poland should be guided by interests, not values - cooperation with China is possible	x	
R19 Conflicts with neighbours are possible - especially in the area of historical memory and politics.		
R20 Poland should cooperate with Ukraine	x	x

T. Pawłuszko, The Foreign Policy of Poland and the Problem of Political Rationale, Teoria Polityki, Jagiellonian University, 6/2022, pp. 237-255.

The differences between conservative and liberal views on foreign and security policy are noticeable. As seen above, there are few shared policy visions in Polish foreign policy (R3, R4, R11, R15, R20). One can only confirm that the common priority of all circles influencing Polish foreign policy is to build a stronger position for Poland in the region and to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. The table below attempts to juxtapose the above views in the optics of liberalism and political realism.

POLICY	JUSTIFICATION	REFERENCE TO THEORY	APPROACH
Focus on the region	R1, R2, R4, R12	Smaller countries can be more easily dominated	Realism
Focus on cooperation with Germany and France	R8, R14, R15	You can get strong countries to cooperate through a bandwagoning strategy	Liberalism
Criticism of EU policy	R6, R13,	The idea of sovereignty is more important than treaties	Realism
Cooperation with the EU	R14, R17	International organisations reduce transaction costs and reduce the advantage of large countries over small ones.	Liberalism
Close cooperation with the US	R3, R4, R10	Cooperation in alliances enhances deterrence capabilities	Realism, liberalism
The soft power of Poland as a leader of democratic transformation	R7, R11, R20	The image of a successful country strengthens international standing	Liberalism
Poland should oppose Russia's neo-imperialist policies	R1, R3, R5, R11, R20	Democratic countries build peace in international relations	Liberalism
Poland should be assertive and seek the realisation of interests around the world, including in authoritarian countries	R15, R18	Power and security, which are the main interests of the state, should be pursued	Realism

T. Pawłuszko, The Foreign Policy of Poland and the Problem of Political Rationale, Teoria Polityki, Jagiellonian University, 6/2022, pp. 237-255.

The above table summarises a broad spectrum of foreign policy directions. Poland is the largest country and leading economy in the region. Many politicians and columnists argue that Poland's regional position should prompt Warsaw to conduct policy in the spirit of political realism. According to this approach, Poland should be assertive and focus on security policy. The realist approach views international politics as a competition for power or a struggle of interests, rather than cooperation and negotiation. Conservative politicians are distrustful of the EU and new policy trends (green transition, technological change). In addition, the war in Ukraine and the NATO summit in Madrid have led to the popularisation of the issue of the country's military security in the public debate, a narrative that conservative politicians have reinforced with announcements of the expansion and modernisation of the Polish army. The increase in armaments spending is generally well received by Polish public opinion and has elicited favourable comments within NATO.

Proponents of the liberal view treat politics similarly to a market game and believe that Poland should be an important player in mainstream European politics and look after the modernisation and economic interests of society. The basic interests of the state in the liberal view relate to good relations with major trading partners (Germany, France, the Netherlands, the US, etc.) and with the regulator of standards in the market (the European Union). According to the liberal view, Poland should reduce cooperation with authoritarian countries and promote as its soft power the development of liberal values (freedom, rationalism, human rights, rule of law, meritocracy) in Eastern Europe and beyond. Contemporary liberal authors believe that Poland should be among the leaders of the EU and pursue membership in the G-20. Liberals argue that Poland should cooperate with democratic states and support Ukraine in building a modern state along the lines of Poland's transformation and Europeanisation processes.

Is a consensus in Polish security policy possible in the face of war in Eastern Europe? The presence of different visions of Polish security policy in the public debate prompts the search for compromise intermediate solutions. Thus, the above theoretical research has been complemented by empirical studies, which were conducted among experts who professionally deal with security policy problems, with a particular focus on foreign affairs. Part two of the report contains the results of this research.

REPORT - EMPIRICAL STUDY

INTRODUCTION

This part of the report covers the analysis of evoked data, obtained during interviews and expert surveys. The data acquisition process is outlined below. The respondents in the survey were 29 professionals (out of 42 selected for the study)². The selection of experts for the study was based on several requirements, which were: at least 5 years of experience in security policy analysis (usually more than 10 years), having expert publications in this area, current media activity on the report's issues, i.e. acting as opinion leaders. Experts gave a total of 236 statements on topics related to Poland's security policy. Their statements have been categorised and assigned to selected research threads, and then authenticated. Experts are an independent group among foreign and security policy stakeholders. As a result, their statements are characterised by greater freedom and explanatory power than those of columnists, officials, or politicians committed to specific political interests.

A SIMPLIFIED RESEARCH PROCESS DONE FOR THE REPORT:



A peculiarity in a qualitative study of this type is the fact that experts participate. Expert statements are characterised by a specialised vocabulary, are thoughtful and subject to methodological rigour. When communicating with experts, it was decided to structure the interview only slightly, allowing freedom in the choice of arguments, length of statements and development of side threads. The collected notes were processed and authorised. In addition to discussing the issues selected for analysis, it was decided to publish quotes from experts in a formula that relates to narrative collage. In accordance with the methodology of grounded theory, the material, hypotheses and conclusions were developed, verified and supplemented over the course of the study. The basic idea was that the data collected from the experts would allow a deeper understanding of the situation. The data collected is open and can lead to further work. The internal limitations of the project are the limited scope of the topic, the limited scale of data acquisition (time and places) and the limited size of the report, which means that the threads taken up can be continued, supplemented and developed in separate studies.

2 Not all of the experts found time to talk or fill out the survey. The experts taking part in the survey spoke anonymously and on their own behalf, associated with such expert and/or scientific institutions as: *The Sobieski Institute, the Kazimierz Pułski Foundation, the College of Eastern Europe, the Institute of New Europe, the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Central Europe, Defence24, the Centre for Strategic Analysis, the Stratpoints Foundation, the Polish Geopolitical Society, Polityka Insight, the Polish Space Agency, the Academy of Land Forces, the Naval Academy, the University of Warsaw, the Jagiellonian University, the University of Wrocław, the University of Gdańsk, the University of Opole, the Jan Kochanowski University, the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, the University of Łódź, the Nicolaus Copernicus University, the Kazimierz Wielki University, the Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski Krakow Academy, the Łazarski University, and others.*

THE POLISH POSITION IN EUROPE

The theoretical research conducted indicates that Poland's situation as a medium-sized state depends on its position in the international system, the shape of which is determined by dominant states, traditionally called superpowers. The Russian-Ukrainian war and the response to it by major states and international organisations indicates that the superpowers are the ones imposing the framework for international competition and cooperation. This constitutes an important circumstance in the analysis of Poland's policy. **Experts were asked to assess the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Poland's international position.**

The experts highlighted several related issues: (1) assessment of the state's position, (2) assessment of the international situation and, finally, (3) the impact of the international situation on the position of the Polish state.

Experts note that Poland's position has not yet been studied in a systematic manner. Only a few publications and doctrinal documents have been published dedicated to this issue. As a result, the discussion on this topic is limited and does not have the characteristics of a professional debate, but is a field of ideological discussion. Experts point out that a country's position is a product of tangible factors (economy, trade, armed forces) and intangible factors (image, international roles, norms).

Most experts agree that the war has influenced Poland's periodic rise to prominence in Eastern Europe due to: (1) accurate identification of the Russian threat, (2) geographic location, which was used to shield the rest of the continent and support Ukraine in its defence against Russia. In addition, (3) the convergence of interests between Poland and the dominant Western countries, especially the US, worked. However, this situation will not last long.

As a result, Poland has become a "security hub" through three processes:

1. U.S. and NATO support (counter-intelligence protection and support of NATO military transports)
2. significant grassroots humanitarian aid to Ukraine (several million refugees)
3. significant government military aid to Ukraine (equipment, training of Ukrainian forces)

The state's position was temporarily strengthened by the periodic consensus of Polish political forces around the above processes. According to experts, Poland should increase the "geopolitical dividend" resulting from the international roles acquired. After more than two decades of presence in NATO, Poland is moving from the role of "security consumer" to that of "bastion" or "security provider" in the region. However, this is a new and important role that Polish elites must learn.

Experts are sceptical about the rapid growth of Poland's ability to influence other countries (see quotes below). Warsaw's influence in formal and informal international bodies remains small. However, experts stress that the current time represents a kind of "window of opportunity" for Poland. This is an opportunity for a "new opening" and to prepare Poland for long-term changes in the international order in the region. This process will take years.

Experts note that security policy has become one of the priorities of the Polish government in 2022:

1. **Defence policy** – The Polish government has announced a wide-ranging armament programme (purchase of tanks, howitzers, missile systems, combat-training aircraft, attack helicopters, multi-role helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, etc.). Work on defence reform has accelerated; an increase in spending and an increase in the size of the armed forces have been announced.
2. **Domestic Policy** – A draft law on civil protection has been presented.
3. **Foreign Policy** – Poland and Ukraine are “writing a new chapter” in the history of mutual relations. This challenge is an opportunity for Poland’s “new eastern policy” towards the post-Soviet region.

Some experts point out the large costs of the war for the Polish state (military weakening, disruption of energy security, social assistance for refugees). As a result, it is emphasised that Poland’s political position has periodically increased, but its economic and military position has not necessarily increased anymore. In the long term, economic standing and alliance ties will prove important to the country’s position. Meanwhile, the economy is suffering losses and relations with allies are limited. Some experts note that Poland’s position has increased only within NATO, but has already remained much weaker in the European Union (Polish elites are not very active in debates about the future of Europe). It should also be stressed that Poland will not be the deciding state on the shape of peace in Ukraine, although it will probably be consulted.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *Poland’s importance has increased, but this, however, is due to external factors, not some Polish initiative or strategy. It is to be appreciated that in recent months on the issue of security the Polish government has avoided any noticeable slip-ups. In addition, the currently large arms purchases enjoy public support and reinforce the impression of Poland’s important role in the region. [W82]*
- *It has also proved that political consensus within the political class is possible. This allowed Poland to box in proportion to its weight. In the context of the future, it is worth pointing out the need for Poland to be more active within the framework of international organisations, as we seem to be doing too little in this area. Meanwhile, Poland today is a kind of “bastion” of the West, and it is worth taking advantage of this position. So far, we are “not building up” in the debate around strategic issues such as energy, the EU, crises, or relations with China. We should participate. [W100]*
- *Poland’s importance grows periodically due to our geostrategic position, but this does not mean a permanent improvement in our country’s position in international relations. This is because the position of a country should be measured by its influence on the international community, and this influence is small in the case of Poland. With political disputes with France, Germany and the US, Poland’s position will continue to be weak. At the moment, the war provides a certain “umbrella” for the Polish government, which means greater security. (...) Poland, however, is below its rank politically today. [W163]*

- *The situation in Ukraine has not led to a strengthening of Poland's political position in Europe. This is due to the lack of a long-term strategy in foreign policy, defence policy, and economic policy. The political elite in Poland does not have sufficient connections and relations with the leaders of Western European countries and political leaders of the main parties at the national and European level, which would allow it to obtain greater support, for example, from the EC in reducing the effects of the war in Ukraine on the Polish economy and society (e.g., the issue of energy policy, strengthening economic ties in strategic projects between EU regions). [W37]*
- *Due to Poland's isolation in the international arena (...) it seems that Poland has no chance to be a regional leader. Currently, even Poland's leadership within the V4 and B9 is problematic. Betting only on the U.S. is far too little to play a larger role in the future. Media "purchases" of military equipment may prove to be a misguided investment, as they focus on the current situation (and in a limited way) and do not take into account the future international security environment and technological advances. The acquisition of operational capabilities should be dictated by environmental considerations 10 years ahead, not yesterday. [W46]*

ASSESSMENT OF THE NATO SUMMIT IN MADRID

During the NATO Summit (29-30.06.2022), two of its main documents were quoted in the media: 1) the new *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* and 2) the Summit Declaration. The alliance has pledged to expand the response force from 40,000 troops to about 300,000. However, this process will require numerous agreements and will take years. The main threat to the Alliance has become Russia, which acts through "coercion, attempts to overthrow the authorities, aggression and annexation" (*coercion, subversion, aggression, annexation*). NATO has stressed that it is a defensive alliance and only responds to Moscow's violations of successive rules of international order (this is informed by the *Strategic Concept*, points 8 and 9.). Russia is mentioned in the *Strategic Concept* a total of a dozen times, mainly as a norm-breaking country and a greater threat to democracy than the following, defined in turn: destabilisation processes, terrorism, instability in the African and Middle Eastern regions, China's challenge, cybersecurity, technology, erosion of arms control systems, or climate. The 2022 Strategic Concept emphasises China's ambitions (points 13. and 14.), although it declares NATO's openness to dialogue and transparency ("constructive engagement" and "reciprocal transparency"). At the same time, NATO stresses its willingness to uphold an order based on (Western, legal international) principles and its readiness to respond to China's use of coercive and divisive tactics against Alliance members.

The experts were asked to assess the implications of the NATO summit in Madrid for Poland and its security policy. In discussing the issue, experts mainly raised two questions, namely (1) the condition of NATO in general and (2) the summit's provisions in the context of the Eastern European region.

Respondents emphasise that the summit's resolutions and the shape of the Alliance's new strategic concept were the result of compromise. The summit showed the evolutionary nature of the Alliance and its dependence on the political will of key players such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Experts say NATO is returning to its traditional role as a defensive military alliance. Russia has been explicitly described as a "threat", marking the political end of the *Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security* of 1997.

Some experts stress that it is increasingly difficult to work out joint decisions in NATO. As an example, they cite the fact that aid to Ukraine, which is fighting a Russian invasion, is coordinated *de facto* by the United States along with a "coalition of the willing" (unlike, for example, operations in Afghanistan).

Experts are critical of improving the military security of NATO's eastern states. Fears persist among the region's elites that the will to respect the "NATO-Russia Act" will prevail, which could diminish the status of post-communist states as "second-class" allies. This is significant because NATO's doctrine of strategic deterrence (i.e., through punishment) has failed. Many experts emphasise that only deterrence by denial can be effective, and this means a permanent military presence near the borders with the Russian Federation and a return to NATO territory defence plans with assigned military structures to defend specific territories. What is needed, therefore, is "normal" defence planning, instead of "contingency" planning. Meanwhile, the summit only called for an increase in the number of NRF response forces (from 40,000 to 300,000 troops), and it is difficult to assess to what extent countries will implement these demands. Back in March 2022, NATO decided to develop 4 additional battle groups in the B9 countries. However, the already-anticipated expansion of battle groups in the Baltic States and Poland under NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence - eFP) to brigade level is unlikely to materialise. This situation will require a lot of activity by the B9 countries in the coming years to strengthen cooperation with the US and Western European countries.

Referring to Poland's situation after the NATO summit, the experts pointed to several important issues. Given the events and decisions of NATO summits in recent years, **Poland is now indispensable in shaping any transatlantic strategy toward Russia. This implies the need for increased diplomatic activity, commensurate with Warsaw's growing military importance in the region.** At the same time, experts point

out that Poland still seems unprepared for the full-scale conflict we are seeing in Ukraine. Equipment and personnel shortages in the armed forces are problematic. These deficiencies cannot be replaced by allies. Significant personnel and equipment expansion of the Polish army was announced in the autumn of 2021 and accelerated after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Political and military cooperation with the United States is proceeding in parallel. Experts also stress the importance of communicating Poland's strategies and actions in the military security sphere to NATO neighbours, and this would be an important statement to take more responsibility for the region.

Another problem is non-military security issues, such as the economy, energy, and cybersecurity. China's increased activity has been observed in this area. It is worth mentioning that the NATO summit in Madrid has set a new vector for NATO security policy – China. Meanwhile, as several experts have pointed out, "There is no Polish policy toward China".

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *Every NATO summit is a landmark, as it defines the Alliance's policy towards new challenges. NATO can be compared to a company that has a director and is accountable to a board of shareholders. NATO is constantly "working on itself" and evolving in response to threats. At the moment, it is important to note Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's proactive stance on strategic communication. The number and size of military exercises have also increased, and the logistics, resilience and tools necessary for the Alliance's response to various threats have improved. NATO is constantly learning and the 360-degree approach is proof of that. For Poland, the existence of battle groups and their rotation is beneficial, allowing a large number of soldiers to become familiar with the terrain of a potential military confrontation. [W119]*
- *The NATO summit in Madrid was quite fruitful, and in principle it is difficult to expect more in terms of the allies' presence on the eastern flank. In Spain or Greece, the problems in relations with Russia are as abstract as for us the problems of the High North. NATO, however, still works – if Russia knew that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation would not work, then it would make numerous provocations against, for example, the Baltic states. NATO's problem lies mainly in the psychological weakness of the countries in the European part of NATO. [W92]*
- *The NATO summit was not a breakthrough regarding the situation on the eastern flank. More important now is the practical implementation of its general findings. For Poland, it is particularly important to deter Russia effectively in order to eliminate the possibility of a war that would have to be fought on our territory again. Meanwhile, what is problematic in the summit documents is the lack of a clear response to Russia's new nuclear doctrine. Poland is not a nuclear state, but we should become active in this field. Not just in terms of nuclear sharing. Poland should also have a position on this issue and ensure, for example, that the F-35 aircraft being procured will have the capability to carry nuclear warheads. Also open should be the problem of Poland's readiness to station allied nuclear weapons on our territory. Russia has regularly used nuclear weapons as a tool of intimidation and coercion since the beginning of the conflict with Ukraine – and the use of such weapons in Ukraine is still a reality. [W155]*
- *The findings of the Madrid NATO summit continue (to a limited extent) the process of strengthening the security policy trends favourable to Poland, taking place since 2014. As a manifestation of this, we should consider the fact of the decision to strengthen the NATO presence in the Baltic States and Romania, the establishment of a permanent V Corps headquarters in Poland, the increase in the number of NATO*

member states' armed forces on high alert, or the deployment of armaments in advance in the countries bordering Russia, as well as support for the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO (not to mention the symbolic support of Ukraine). At the same time, it should be noted that this is a continuation of the processes initiated with NATO's response to the 2014 limited Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this context, it is also worth noting the reactivity of this type of action (first it was a response to the limited invasion of 2014 and now it is a response to the full-scale invasion of this year). [W20]

- Poland should significantly strengthen its defence capabilities and demonstrate leadership in regional defence initiatives. These initiatives must be real, not just on paper. Poland should meet two conditions in this regard:
 1. *Acquire defence capabilities by sticking to the process of so-called capabilities-based planning, and not on the basis of choosing from a store of nice or fashionable toys.*
 2. *Agree with regional partners that all countries (e.g., B9) will adhere to this principle, and make a concerted effort to acquire capabilities through cooperation rather than on their own. If there is no well-functioning defence industry, it will run out of resources after the first week. Of course, defence planning should include a 10-year-plus perspective. [W47]*
- *(...) Poland is a country that bears the increased costs and risks of the war in Ukraine, hence it should prepare concrete plans today for greater support within NATO and in bilateral cooperation with the Alliance countries. We seem to be interested (at least currently) only in cooperation with the US, completely ignoring partners from Europe. It can be assumed that the Madrid agreements will not fundamentally change the existing security policy, we will continue with sham (conceptual) actions and not very well thought-out arms purchases, hoping to ensure security through American outsourcing (increasing the presence of US troops). [W74]*
- *The NATO summit was beneficial for Poland, although it does not offset the internal problems of creating Polish security policy. Such problems include the rather haphazard transfer of various military units to expand the 18th mechanized division, or the spending of many defence funds outside the budget and parliamentary control. Poland is spending a lot of money on arms purchases, although Russia will not be able to wage another full-scale war in Europe any time soon. This will be possible in maybe 15 years. This does not mean that the Polish military should not be armed and modernised. However, this must be done on the basis of clear rules with democratic standards of control. [W110]*
- *The NATO summit did not bring a breakthrough. The Alliance's presence in the region remains unsatisfactory. The threats to Poland, however, do not appear to be great. Russia does not have the potential to wage another full-scale war. Moreover, Russia's kleptocratic elites will eventually try to end this war [with Ukraine], which is unfavourable to them. Poland currently does not have a clear policy even towards long-standing neighbours such as Belarus (e.g., we supported the Belarusian opposition when Lukashenko was strong, and when Lukashenko started - around 2018. - weakening - we gave up this support, at the same time we misjudged the chances of success of the 2020 revolution, which had no chance, because the nomenklatura did not abandon Lukashenko). [W191]*
- *I will point out one thing. Recognition of Russia as a threat by NATO as a whole. Thus, many governments that even after 2014 were not ready to do so, and Russia was written about in security policy documents as, for example, "a difficult partner," and the war in Ukraine as "events in Ukraine". After the Madrid summit, it can be assumed that all member states already have the same attitude toward Russia seeing it as a threat, even if not to themselves, then to allies. This also applies to Hungary, which, as a NATO member, has adopted this position. Those running Poland's security policy should take advantage of this. [W220]*

NATO FORCE DEPLOYMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE - JUNE 2022



40 000

TROOPS UNDER DIRECT
NATO COMMAND

100 000

US TROOPS DEPLOYED
TO EUROPE



130

ALLIED AIRCRAFT
AT HIGH ALERT



140

ALLIED SHIPS
AT SEA

JUNE 2022

ALL NUMBERS INDICATIVE



nowe media 24.pl

NATO'S EASTERN FLANK STRONGER DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE



**AMPHIBIOUS
TASK FORCE**



**CARRIER
STRIKE
GROUP**


źródło: NATO's military presence in the east of the Alliance, 8 lipca 2022,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm



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

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**24/7
AIR PATROL
& SURVEILLANCE**




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
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SWEDEN AND FINLAND'S ACCESSION TO NATO

Experts were asked about the significance of Sweden's and Finland's accession to NATO for Poland.

Virtually all experts stressed that it is to Poland's advantage to have these countries join the Alliance. Moreover, the process appears to be one of the biggest changes in the European security architecture since at least 1999. According to respondents, NATO enlargement demonstrates the continued attractiveness and credibility of the Alliance. It also reduces the power of Russian information operations in Eastern Europe (narratives of a "rotten West" or "new Yalta"). The growth of NATO's presence in northern and eastern Europe, moreover, is a form of consolidation and expansion of Western structures, and as such is in keeping with Jerzy Giedroyc's ideas about "moving the West to the East."

Experts emphasise in unison that with this NATO expansion there will be a reduction in Russia's influence from the Baltic.

The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO makes the Baltic Sea a "NATO lake". This process will not only affect the Alliance's prestige, but also improve its logistical capabilities, in terms of deployment of forces, military training and exercise capabilities, as well as industrial cooperation. Meanwhile, for Russia, the "northern expansion of NATO" means a serious political and military problem, as the land border with NATO has definitively lengthened, and Kaliningrad has become a problem for Moscow instead of an asset. This is because it is estimated that the potential defence capability of Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by NATO countries, would be low.

Many experts emphasise the importance of the intangible factor, i.e., threat perception. What is important for Poland is that the Scandinavian countries have a similar attitude towards Russia.

For the Baltic states, Sweden and Finland joining NATO will be most beneficial. NATO will therefore be stronger - it has been joined by countries that are wealthy, have modern armed forces, have a civic culture and strong traditions of statehood. In addition, the amalgamation of NATO's "northern flank" moves Poland to the "second row" in a potential conflict. Some experts have expressed the opinion that this process reduces the risk of a Polish-Russian war by an estimated half.

It is important to note the duality of the experts' approach to the consequences of the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO for Polish security policy.

On the one hand, it is emphasised that from now on Poland no longer needs to focus on the development of Baltic policy and naval expansion. On the other hand, experts see a lot of room for developing political, military cooperation (military exercises, exchange of officers, military education) and industrial cooperation with the Nordic countries, which would require the expansion of Poland's naval capabilities. Both groups of experts agree, however, that the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO relieves Poland's military support for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

It is worth adding that the northern European region is one of the most institutionally developed areas of international cooperation. Experts oriented to the development of Nordic cooperation institutions emphasise that Poland needs a kind of "road map" for the development of relations with the countries of the region. As long as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues, initiatives of this type will be facilitated.

Moreover, Nordic models of intergovernmental cooperation can serve as a model for the development of Central European initiatives, such as the Three Sea Initiative (TSI), or the Bucharest Nine (B9). In addition, the construction of a kind of "Baltic Alliance" could minimise political differences between the subregions of Northern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, which are bound to occur in the future.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *[The admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO] means a great strengthening of NATO's northern flank, a fundamental change in the operational situation in the Baltic Sea, and the marginalisation of the Polish Navy in NATO's contingency plans (our current capabilities are not much ahead of the Baltic States). At the same time, it provides an opportunity to undertake good cooperation (especially with Sweden) in the field of operational interaction and in the arms industry, but here it is necessary to be a reliable and predictable partner. Since Germany's foreign (naval) policy is currently focused on the Indo-Pacific area (presence of ships and aircraft), this situation creates opportunities for the navies of Poland and Sweden to be the main operational forces in the Baltic. Related to this will be two issues, the reconstruction of the Polish navy and the establishment of the NATO Maritime Command for the area of this sea as an operational sub-region (today it is one operational area with the North Sea). [W75]*
- *The admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO is the biggest event in the Alliance since 1999, when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted to NATO. However, while the 1999 enlargement was a typical political move, the current enlargement is strategic and completely changes the balance of power in Northern Europe. Russia has been marginalised in the Baltic Sea. The changes were already visible during Putin's recent flight to Kaliningrad, when the Russian plane had to weave its way in the sky. Poland must develop partnerships with Sweden and Finland as soon as possible. They should be our partners first. This especially concerns joint projects and military exercises. In addition, the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO leads to increased security for the Baltic States. Thus, the risk of an attack on NATO's eastern flank has decreased. It can be estimated that this has reduced the threat to Poland by at least half. What is needed is a kind of "road map" for the development of relations with new NATO members. [W156]*
- *In the operational sphere, this is an unquestionable positive. Leaving aside the issue of political-military cooperation with Poland, which is also desired by both countries, we gain as a state the ability to monitor Russia's operational activities in the western direction. In political terms, this is a partial and specific "push back" of Russia from the Polish border by necessitating military action first in the area of Finland and then (or simultaneously with action against the Baltics and Poland) Sweden. This also forces a radical reshaping of the Russian concept of the so-called "offensive defensive operation" in the western direction. In the political sphere, on the other hand, new threats may emerge in the form of unconventional actions to replace the current A2/AD concept. This includes actions taken indirectly against the Polish state. These could include actions in the form of disruption of the continuity of supply by sea, diversionary and sabotage attacks on energy production systems (wind farms) or LNG regasification systems. [W203]*
- *[The admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO means] pure benefits. First, the significant lengthening of the Russia-NATO border and the resulting need to restructure Russian strategic planning, including the weakening of forces destined for the Polish direction. Secondly, turning the Baltic Sea practically into a NATO "inner sea," which increases the security of our coast and our sensitive lines of communication. Third, logistical facilitation for NATO intervention forces in the northern part of the eastern flank, which indirectly increases the security of primarily Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but also Poland. Fourth, new opportunities for cooperation in the arms industry, training, intelligence and counterintelligence, etc. Fifth, increasing the political voice inside NATO of countries that are - by nature - "Russia-sceptical". Sixth, potentially shifting the centre of gravity of our security policy to Baltic cooperation, much more promising than Central European mirages. Seventh, it is an affirmation of the role and attractiveness of NATO (...). [W212]*

- *In the first stage of this process [the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO] there is a unanimous voice of Poland, Sweden and Finland in the assessment of the Russian Federation. The ongoing war hides the (cultural) differences between these countries. In the long run, this will not be such a favourable process – a strong group of “northern NATO” countries will emerge, which will often present a different opinion than Poland – even in the assessment of Russia (the Czech Republic and Slovakia will not join us in this dispute). This will increase the multipolarity of NATO itself, with all its baggage of gains as well as losses and limitations. A period of peace will reveal strong and numerous cultural differences (...). [W3]*

POLAND'S SECURITY POLICY - STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Experts were asked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Poland's security policy. This topic aroused the most excitement of all the issues raised, as it concerns the diagnosis of issues that are part of the day-to-day activities of state institutions. However, the recorded statements of experts from different backgrounds were complementary rather than contradictory.

THE STRENGTHS OF POLISH SECURITY POLICY INCLUDE:

- *Public support for security initiatives*
- *Poland's good position in NATO*
- *A proactive posture in military security policy*
- *Readiness to defend allies*
- *Quantitative and qualitative military potential*
- *Public acceptance of rising costs in the area of defence*
- *Relative consensus on the perception of threats from Russia*
- *Maintaining our own arms industry*
- *Possession of repair, storage and training infrastructure*
- *An active approach to critical infrastructure protection*
- *Development of territorial defence institutions*
- *Attempts at long-term planning for modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces (2013-2022, 2021-2035)*

Among the strengths of Poland's security policy was emphasised the special role of the Armed Forces and society's willingness to invest in improving internal and external security. Attention is drawn to the infrastructure in place and the considerable human resources potential. There is an appreciation of the fact that Poland is a large country by Central and Eastern European standards, which arouses a desire among the country's elite to discount this status. As noted above, Poland's position in NATO structures has been somewhat strengthened by virtue of its high level of activity following the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Respondents state that efforts should be made to ensure that as many countries as possible share the Polish point of view on the problems present in Eastern Europe.

Many experts stress that the strengths of Poland's security policy are revealed immediately, as soon as a cross-party elite consensus is settled. Then the state's actions have legitimacy and quickly get a response from partners, because then Poland acts as a country of tens of millions. However, when there are ideological divisions on a security-relevant issue (the government or opposition tries to impose its will, instead of agreeing on the scope of the state's cross-party security interest), then the political weight of a given decision weakens.

THE WEAKNESSES OF POLISH SECURITY POLICY INCLUDE:

- *Lack of continuity in decision-making and the bickering of political elites*
- *Lack of a Polish vision of security policy in the EU*
- *Limited ability to agree on joint activities within NATO*
- *Reluctance to regional security formats such as the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force).*
- *Limited ability to carry out plans made*
- *Vulnerability to ideological infiltration and diversion*
- *Perception of foreign and security policy as a function of party politics*
- *Technological backwardness in some areas of security*
- *Outdated civil defence / civil protection system*
- *Lack of stronger cooperation with Romania and Finland (countries with similar dilemmas)*
- *Conflicts with neighbours*
- *Inconsistent energy security policy*
- *Poor quality of reserves for the Polish Armed Forces*

In discussing the main weaknesses of Polish security policy, experts pointed to both tangible and intangible factors. The former include lack of resources, personnel and institutions. To the latter – problems of political culture (bias, unwillingness to plan and learn), which affects the low quality of decision-making and insufficient development of material resources.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *Our weakness is our political and strategic culture, which betrays our entanglement in history, which is full of tragic events, such as the collapse of the state several times, the lack of continuity of power, and the dire situation in which the past deprived us of opportunities for development (expenses were incurred on armaments, not on development). Swedes in the twentieth century built houses and fished, while we at that time had two world wars, communism and produced tanks. Importantly, for many generations in Poland, people who were willing to do something for the community – perished instead of being rewarded. In the long run, this can lead to a kind of demoralisation and rejection of the value of action for the common good. [W94]*
- *Our strengths (...) are our trained personnel. Our weakness is decision-making systems. The civilian anti-crisis system is in bad shape. Civil protection institutions (Civil Defence) and critical infrastructure protection, are in a state of decay. The political factor also influences the fact that Poland, for example, did not benefit from Frontex assistance during the Belarus crisis, nor from offers from the European Commission. Best practices were not used e.g. Greece, developed during the 2015 migrant crisis. Another problem is the divisiveness of the political elite. [W112]*

- *Poland's strength is that there is a consensus around the important role of the armed forces. No one denies the importance of defence issues. We also have good personnel. The problem of maintaining reserves for the professional army remains. We lack an effective reserve training system. If we don't take care of this, then the topic of basic military service will return in the future. In addition, there is a lack of transparency around the Polish army's technical modernisation programme. [W121]*
- *The good thing is that we are making efforts to modernise the army (cooperation with the Koreans is a snub to the Americans, who behaved too arrogantly in our region). On the other hand, we should say goodbye to dreams of expanding the industrial base and transferring technology. (...) It should also be noted that some of our purchases are scaled. [W193]*
- *A weakness is the lack of a cross-party approach to security policy and the adoption by the major political parties of a common programme to build defence capabilities for the next, say, 15 years. In the form of a document, signed by the leaders, committing them to implementation after winning the election. This has been done in Sweden - and it is needed in Poland as well. [W222]*
- *The strong points of Polish security policy are certainly the financial stability and social prestige of the military. Poland has been consistently developing the prestige of the army for years and has allocated significant resources to this end. The army is an element of the seriousness of the state in international relations. Other countries do not take the status of the military as seriously as Poland. On the other hand, however, there is a noticeable decline in the importance of the General Staff, which seems to have lost its influence on the directions of the army development. It is not very clear what the current role of the most important Polish soldiers is in the process of modernisation, equipment purchases and expansion of the army. [W157]*
- *The weakness is the partisanship of the security policies. The security of the state and the nation belongs to state-wide issues. (...) The entrenchment of security policy leads to unfavourable changes in the perception of Poland. Poland is beginning to be seen as a "seasonal" state, because if one party has "taken over" and changed the cadres in all institutions of the state it means that another party can also do so. Then our partners may think that [...] "the authorities in Poland can always change". As a result, after every election the country may completely change its policies and the result will be unstable and unreliable. [W17]*
- *The main weakness of Poland's security policy is the elite's inability to build a long-term consensus on the detailed way to commit material inputs to strengthen Poland's security. The lack of cross-party debate causes changes in power to alter the concept of strengthening the security of the Polish state. At the same time, different concepts of strengthening Poland's security can operate within the bosom of the parties in power at any given time (even ministers from the same party can interrupt the implementation of programmes initiated by predecessors from the same party). As a result, Poland's security policy is characterised by a lack of continuity in some arms programmes (programmes are interrupted and started in more or less different configurations from the beginning) or their significant dilution over time. [W22]*

- *The key weakness of Polish security policy is the lack of systematised action, the weakness of public institutions (...) in the implementation of the strategy. Actions are taken in an ad hoc manner, without in-depth analysis and assuming a short functional period. In addition, Poland has not developed an efficient decision-making process at the ministerial and inter-ministerial levels. Decisions, e.g., on purchases of key equipment and armaments, inclusion in the defence or armaments programme, are made by a narrow group of policy makers or by one person. There is no real control and parliamentary oversight of the Defence Ministry and other ministries. [W40]*
- *Poland's problems are related to the structures of the state: the problem of spending, conflicting visions of decision-makers, a very sharp political dispute, and a lack of strategic thinking. Also, in the media there are ever fewer topics taken up seriously and, as a result, awareness of many issues is decreasing. Another problem is the weakness and underfunding of institutions (including universities, think tanks). A syndrome of this "disease" is also, for example, the development of geopolitics, which fills (...) the vacuum in the international debate in Poland. Thus, the quality of public debate is declining, and (...) many experts are engaged in journalism and discussions on Twitter. In addition, mention should be made of the siloed nature of information circulation between institutions. [W85]*
- *There are several serious weaknesses in Polish security policy. These include: the lack of an idea to debate strategic issues, political divisions generate a lack of consensus among elites, Poland's specific political (and strategic) culture makes it difficult to define the country's long-term goals. As a result, we have to cyclically build many capabilities from scratch. There is also no strategy for the new decade. (...) The risk is also that Polish elites are often hostage to the past, and on the other hand are reluctant to create new visions of the future. In such a situation, a major challenge will be interchangeability - the ability to flexibly change strategies and actions in a complex international environment, especially in the area of security. The strong aspects of Poland's security policy are its location, good relations with the U.S., its current role in NATO, assistance to Ukraine, the existence of opportunities for political consensus, and some political capital based on cooperation with Ukraine and an accurate assessment of the intentions of the Russian Federation. [W103]*
- *A big problem is the mentality of Polish elites, who tend to create "all explaining" or "self-fulfilling" explanations, such as tales of Western betrayal. The focus of our politicians on myths makes them immune to facts, and events and ideas that are inconsistent with their proclaimed views are treated as manifestations of the fulfilment of their political visions (e.g., any conditions for getting along with Russia can be described as a "betrayal by the West" or a "new Yalta"). [W193]*

OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR POLAND

Experts were asked to identify the main opportunities and threats to Poland's security policy. It should be noted that in a classic SWOT-type analysis, the assessment of opportunities and threats mainly covers events external to Polish politics, which also affects the scenarios.

The vast majority of experts have made the above issues dependent on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The chances of achieving Poland's security policy goals lie in weakening Russia. With Russian troops exhausted by a prolonged war in Ukraine, the risk of an attack on NATO countries is diminishing and has become less likely than a few years ago, although provocations are still possible. According to experts, Poland has gained 5 to 10 years to develop its capabilities (arms industry, air defence, anti-tank defence, deterrence capacity building, civil protection). Several experts pointed out that a broader review of the national security situation would be useful in such a situation (the last such strategic review ended a decade ago), as well as honouring international commitments within NATO and the EU.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLAND

- *Russia's long-term weakening*
- *Weakening of most neighbours*
- *Acquisition of equipment from NATO partners*
- *Convergence of Polish interests with those of allies*
- *Increasing NATO military capabilities in Eastern Europe*
- *Strengthening Polish soft power as a result of increased military capabilities*
- *Increasing political influence in NATO's "eastern flank" countries*
- *A chance to bridge social divides in the face of military and economic challenges*
- *Recovering respect of Poland's main political partners*

Respondents emphasise that the implementation of long-term investments involves problems present in the military dimension, as well as in the economic, infrastructure, energy, and IT environment. What is needed is a viable state response to the coming challenges. Furthermore, the issue of civil protection systems, which have been awaiting reform for fifteen years, is returning again. An effective increase in Poland's capabilities in providing military, non-military and especially energy security can have a positive impact on improving the country's image and increasing the level of trust among international partners and cooperation.

THREATS TO POLAND

- *Unfavourable outcome of the conflict in Ukraine*
- *Disintegration of the European security system*
- *A protracted war will lead to failed states in Eastern Europe*
- *Risk of decomposition of political structures of the Russian Federation*
- *Danger of escalation of conflicts onto Polish territory*
- *Increase in crime as a result of increased poverty and immigration in the region*
- *Growing threats to energy security*
- *The carousel of state debt*
- *Development of external ideological diversion in Poland*
- *Isolation in the international arena (limited influence on processes abroad)*
- *Lowering instead of strengthening the ability to defend territory*

Analysing the potential threats, experts point to the need to avoid overly narrow and inflexible concepts such as “defence self-sufficiency” and advocate a modular approach, i.e. a commitment to both domestic reforms and a proactive stance in allied, military, industrial, energy and other relations.

According to some experts, a major external threat remains the risk of infiltration of political parties and state structures by foreign intelligence. Most such threats are associated with the East, especially Russia. A contributing factor to these processes is the low level of education of the population about security risks, which reduces resistance to populism.

There are also risks associated with destabilisation or loss of credibility of Western structures such as NATO and the EU. The weakness of multilateral structures can be highlighted during economic and energy crises and as a result of the influence of agents from the East. At the moment, pro-Russian sentiment in Europe has been significantly reduced, which presents an opportunity for the Polish state to work to spread Polish threat perceptions.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *The primary and obvious opportunity arising from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is to strengthen the potential of the Polish state by integrating its citizens in the face of the goal of confronting Russian imperialism and “feeding” the economy with culturally close refugees from Ukraine. The high level of party polarisation means that few mechanisms remain in Polish society to integrate citizens. Providing assistance to refugees from Ukraine and Ukrainians who are fighting Russia on the ground is one of the factors that strengthen the cohesion of Polish society, and thus the potential of the Polish state in international relations. [W23]*

- *The biggest opportunity for Poland comes from Ukraine not only defending its independence, but also creating tensions in Russia's internal political system that could lead to the finalisation of Russia's decolonisation process. This process was initiated in the early 20th century. (the disintegration of the empire of tsarist Russia resulting in, among other things, the independence of Poland or **Finland**) and partially reinforced at the end of the 20th century (the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulting in the formal independence of the former republics, ... and the preservation of the mini-imperium that the Russian Federation remains). This process is still not finalised, as it happened with the French or British colonial empires. [W23B]*
- *Threats, on the other hand, would increase in the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, weakening European unity. The biggest risks, however, are the possible continuation of Poland's own counter-EU policies that threaten to peripheralise Poland in Europe, not to mention its complete isolation in the event of Polesxit. Risks are also generated by a non-strategic approach to the development of the security system, including the armed forces. (...) Meanwhile, reflection should be conducted based on our real capabilities and needs. The war in Ukraine has given us time to correct our mistakes. Meanwhile, there is little reflection of a strategic nature on what the battlefield of the future will look like. What is needed is not copying, but processing the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war. [W158]*
- *The threats are: 1) the possible decomposition of the common European security space in the event of a deepening of the rift between Germany, France and the US and some countries on NATO's eastern flank 2) the fatigue of Western societies with the protracted conflict with Russia and its economic consequences, and the consequent tendency to return to the policy of "appeasement," which will give Russia the opportunity to quickly rebuild its potential and a much more aggressive policy towards our region 3) the deepening of the rivalry between the US and allies with China, including the escalation of the situation around Taiwan, which will likely result in shifting priorities to our disadvantage and, in an extreme variant, also in a Russian diversionary strike in Europe, at Beijing's behest 4) further internal polarisation, favouring foreign information aggression and paralysing for effective security policy 5) continued or deepening negative selection into the political and official elites (...) responsible for security, at the expense of their professionalism. [W214]*

SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO POLAND'S SECURITY (SWOT ANALYSIS)


<p>STRENGTHS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public support for security initiatives • Poland's good position in NATO • A proactive posture in military security policy • Readiness to defend allies • A quantitatively and qualitatively significant military potential • Public acceptance of rising costs in the area of defence • Relative consensus on perception of threats from Russia • Maintaining our own arms industry • Possession of repair, storage and training infrastructure • An active approach to critical infrastructure protection • Development of territorial defence institutions • Attempts at long-term planning for modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces (2013-2022, 2021-2035) 	<p>WEAKNESSES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of continuity in decision-making and the bickering of political elites • Lack of a Polish vision of security policy in the EU • Limited ability to agree on joint actions within NATO • Reluctance to regional security formats such as the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force). • Limited ability to implement the plans made • Vulnerability to infiltration and ideological diversion • Perception of foreign and security policy as a function of party politics • Technological backwardness in some areas of security • Outdated civil defence / civil protection system • Lack of stronger cooperation with Romania and Finland (countries with similar dilemmas) • Conflicts with neighbours • Inconsistent energy security policy • Poor quality of reserves for the Polish Armed Forces
<p>OPPORTUNITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia's long-term weakening • Weakening of most neighbours • Acquisition of equipment from NATO partners • Convergence of Polish interests with those of allies • Increasing capabilities of NATO troops in Eastern Europe. • Strengthening Polish soft power as a result of increased military capabilities • Increasing political influence in NATO's "eastern flank" countries • A chance to bridge social divides in the face of military and economic challenges • Recovering respect of Poland's main political partners 	<p>THREATS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unfavourable outcome of the conflict in Ukraine • Disintegration of the European security system • A protracted war will lead to failed states in Eastern Europe. • Risk of decomposition of political structures of the Russian Federation • Danger of escalation of conflicts onto Polish territory • Increase in crime as a result of increased poverty and immigration in the region • Growing threats to energy security • State debt carousel • Development of external ideological diversions • Isolation in the international arena (limited influence on processes abroad) • Lowering instead of strengthening the ability to defend territory

Source: own elaboration

ROLES FOR POLAND

Experts were asked to identify the optimal international role for Poland in the coming years. The international role of a state relates to both its perception and the function the state performs in the international system. As noted in the theoretical section, Poland has played a variety of roles throughout history. Experts generally shared the opinion that Poland has been a growing medium-sized state for several decades, and therefore there is no ready-made set of roles that can be assigned to Poland on a permanent basis. In addition, some of the respondents' answers related to expected roles.

PROPOSALS OF INTERNATIONAL ROLES FOR POLAND



A state's position in international relations depends on its resources (tangible and intangible) and its ability to play a significant role in the international system. Many small countries have succeeded and become influential players (e.g., South Korea, Singapore, Finland, Switzerland) due to favourable specialisation in global politics and economy. Successful countries have been characterised by stable economic growth, rapid modernisation of industry and services, high efficiency, good education and efficient diplomacy. In the course of expansion, successful countries also consciously built their brand (*nation branding*), which reinforced their chosen roles, such as intermediary, country of innovation, beautiful place to live, etc. Poland's position after 1989 was remarkably strong thanks to subsequent events, such as the Solidarity movement, the peaceful overthrow of communism, and accession to NATO and the EU. Other former Eastern Bloc countries are watching the Polish development path very closely, monitoring Polish legislation and arms purchases, although they do so discreetly.

Currently, Poland is gaining in the region as a country opposed to Russian revisionism. Poland's rise to prominence is proportional to Germany's temporary decline in political (though not economic!) importance. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, Poland's roles were more those of a subordinate country (e.g., a country of cheap labour). With the increase in material potential over the past two decades, the Polish state has gained greater influence in shaping its own role in international relations. Experts emphasise that Poland's main roles now should be consciously built around the country's strengths (see above). Therefore, military and economic roles have been emphasised. It should be added that research largely confirms that the larger the economy and the higher the overall state spending on armaments, the less likely the state is to be subordinated to external forces.

The change in Poland's role in Europe in the long term will result from both external factors (e.g., the decomposition of the Russian Federation, causing conflicts in the region) and internal factors (the increase in Poland's military potential postulated by conservative circles; the inclusion of Poland in the decision-making core of the European Union according to the liberal view). Poland's political circles agree on the growth of the country's economic and military potential, but there is no consensus among them on the way forward.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *It should be constantly emphasised that Poland is more important for Europe than Russia. Because Poland wants a strong Europe, and Russia wants a weak and divided Europe. [W95]*
- *Poland is a medium-sized country. In times of war, the key resource of the state is the army, but in times of peace, the economy is the most important thing. Meanwhile, Poland has weakish tools to influence the EU economic ecosystem. We also have rather weak soft power. If we have a lot of economic power, then other countries will look to us. It is important that we work for the region, and in this sense the TSI initiative [Three Seas Initiative] makes sense, but only if it develops within the EU. Poland needs to expand relations in the region, because by strengthening the region, we strengthen ourselves. We also need to think about having something to offer in the future. [W96]*
- *Poland should focus on its area of direct influence, i.e. the region of the so-called Three Seas, and join the so-called "European engine", the group holding power in the EU. This is in Poland's interest for decades. A good example would be the renewed idea of the Weimar Triangle: France as the leader of Western Europe, Germany as the leader of Central Europe, and Poland as the leader of Eastern Europe. We need pragmatism to see this. Meanwhile, our main problem is a lack of trust from key partners in Europe. [W177]*
- *Over the next three years, Poland's role in Europe will change little. It will continue to be a state that actively seeks to limit Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space and seeks to strengthen the military capabilities of its eastern allies and neighbours, as well as trying to limit Russia's economic cooperation with Western countries and increase the integration of Eastern European countries into Western structures. [W24]*
- *To some extent, it can be considered that Poland is now playing the role of Germany from the first two decades after the Cold War, i.e., a country that promoted the expansion of NATO and the EU to include the former post-Soviet states in order to create a buffer between its own country and the Russian Federation. In deepening this type of role, Poland should be prepared for economic support programmes for potential new candidates. (...) At the same time, if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict led to the decomposition*

of Russia and the outbreak of conflicts in the post-federation space, Poland could be assigned the role of France in Africa, that is, a state carrying out interventions for stabilisation (de facto, it could often be about ensuring the supply of energy resources to Europe in a situation where the extraction and transport would take place on the territory of many countries (...). [W24B]

- *Poland should, in the 2025 perspective and beyond, devote [resources, time] to rebuilding a stable leadership position in selected areas of security policy, e.g. military and energy. Thus, strive to be the voice of the region in the above-mentioned areas of the countries and build economic and political initiatives to strengthen the indicated areas of cooperation. In the military aspect, Poland should establish more soldier exchange programmes with countries in the region and create [new] multinational units. [W42]*

A POSITIVE SCENARIO FOR POLAND

Experts were asked to sketch a favourable future scenario for Poland. Such work makes it possible to visualise and define the state's security interests and facilitates the design of a path to achieve the goal set (this will be the last issue addressed in this study). Again, as in the case of the above issues – the construction of scenarios requires consideration of both the internal situation of Poland and the assumption of a certain course of external events.

In the statements of experts, there are repeated demands for both “Western” and “Eastern” policies. In the case of Western policy, very few experts saw an advantage in conflicts within NATO or the EU. According to the majority of respondents, a good scenario would be a return to the role of a mainstream EU state, which helps secure the country's interests in the event of an uncertain situation in Eastern Europe. Poland's policy, according to experts, should be pragmatic, rational, based on concrete projects and devoid of excessive emotionality. Polish politicians today can capitalise on the fact that “we were right about Russia” in Europe, but just bragging about it is not enough. Any strengthening of relationships requires defining your own offers of cooperation.

Among the issues external to state policy, many experts point to the crisis and even the risk of the breakup of the Russian Federation. This is usually considered a favourable but risky scenario. A similar number of experts argue that overly weakening Russia, Belarus and Ukraine will lead to years of chaos in the region, in which Poland would also lose, as it lacks strong tools to manage crises at home and abroad. It is certainly in Poland's interest for the Ukrainian state to survive as a strong sovereign entity with wide access to the Black Sea, and for Russia to maintain its inefficient, incapable of reform “patrimonial” system.

Other processes favourable to Poland include, for example, maintaining Western unity vis-à-vis Russia and China, sustaining the US military presence in Europe (including Poland), and ending the war in Ukraine as a result of Russia's defeat or Russian withdrawal from the war. The latter would also allow the establishment of a new regime in the area of arms control between Europe and Russia, on terms more favourable to Europe.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *A weakened Russia after political change (democratisation) would probably become a fairly predictable country like Turkey before the advent of President Erdogan. Perhaps there would be a decentralisation of political power in Russia and a loosening of the federation. Such a course of events will strengthen the Polish position in Eastern Europe, both materially and symbolically. Meanwhile, Russia would return to the positions it occupied around the 1990s.* [W88]
- *The defeat of Russia, or even the decomposition of this country – this would mean the end of several hundred years of threat from the east for our part of Europe.* [W187]

- *The most favourable scenario involves the complete liberation of Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation, as well as the decomposition of the Russian Federation itself along federal (and/or ethnic) divisions. With that said, the most favourable scenario assumes that smaller or larger, but partially stable post-federation states would be formed in the areas created after the breakup of the Russian Federation. (...) In the maximum favourable variant, one can assume not only positive changes in the eastern direction, but also in the western direction of Polish security policy. This could include bringing German security perceptions closer to Polish security perceptions, resulting in Germany joining Polish security interests in the post-Soviet space. [W25]*

A NEGATIVE SCENARIO FOR POLAND

In this part of the research, experts were asked to identify unfavourable scenarios from the perspective of Polish security policy. A perspective of up to 5 years was adopted, although some experts pointed to more long-term or very abstract risks to "stimulate thinking".

The main issue discussed by experts would be a change of borders in Eastern Europe, which would also affect the global status of superpowers such as the US, China, Russia, the UK, and Germany. In this sense, the significance of the war in Ukraine is global, as the response to it could influence the strategies of the dominant states towards different regions (with a particular focus on Central and Eastern Europe).

The most frequently mentioned unfavourable scenario for Poland and the region as a whole would be the expansion of the Russian-Ukrainian war to more countries. It does not have to be a full-scale conflict, but an outpouring of unrest, diversions, subliminal activities and chaos. A very negative development would be the division of Ukrainian lands as a result of a Russian invasion or as a result of post-war processes. Another negative development - though perceived as less dangerous for Poland itself - would be the disintegration of Russia leading to chaos in Eurasia (or at least from Belarus to China) or the rise of a modernising faction in the Kremlin capable of convincing a war-weary West of the need to normalise and "modernise Russia."

Experts point to the possibility of regional use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation. Although according to Russia's nuclear doctrine of June 2, 2020, there are no military reasons for using nuclear weapons, because Russia's territory is not threatened militarily from the outside, Putin may reach for nuclear weapons for political (threats to power) or psychological (defence against a "Western attack") reasons. Analysing the expert statements, an attempt has been made to organise the scenarios according to their level of generality. The results are shown below.

PROCESS	LEVEL	POTENTIAL EVENTS
Change in US policy	Systemic - global	A change in US global strategy (e.g., against Russia and China) or in the US political system (isolationist takeover) and abandonment of support for Eastern European countries; the EU, Germany, and Poland are not in a position to replace the US as guarantor of the region's security
Strengthening Russia	Systemic - macro-regional	The Russian Federation is subjugating Ukraine and using its influence in Belarus to prepare for further reconstruction of the empire. Resigned Western countries are opting for a policy of adjustment and abandoning aid to Eastern European countries.
Chaos in Eastern Europe	Systemic - macro-regional	In the perspective of a few years, chaos is possible in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (possible collapse of leadership, assassinations, economic crisis, poverty, nationalism).
Post-war crisis across Europe	Macroregional	The economic crisis will weaken the cohesion of NATO and the EU and lead to a rise in populism in the region. Russia may then initiate a new local conflict, hoping to provoke a biased and weaker Western response.
The post-war crisis in Eastern Europe	Regional	Eastern Europe will lose economically for the next decade due to geopolitical risks. There will be an increase in inequality in the EU
Crisis in Poland	Local	Strong political polarisation paralyses state strategy and makes Poland a "drifting" state, reactive to external events and susceptible to infiltration.

Many experts point out the need for Poland to be proactive in the face of crises. Against this backdrop, it is important to diagnose the political strategies of Polish elites, who tend to have “closed” narratives. For example, the narrative of “betrayal of the West” isolates us from actively thinking about Western Europe as a space for the realisation of Polish interests. The other narrative is about Eastern Europe and can be reduced to the claim that “the Russians are weak,” which insulates us from thinking seriously about Eastern Europe. According to experts, these are “erroneous mental shortcuts”. It is necessary to avoid “magical thinking” and look at politics “factually”, that is, to take into account various forces, not only military. Some experts expressed the belief that “the West will get along with Russia sooner or later, and we have to be prepared for that”.


SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *Unfavourable from Poland’s perspective would certainly be an increase in the threat from Russia, a growing risk of nuclear extortion, talks between the West and Russia at the expense of the CEE region, the failure of the idea of European strategic autonomy, the fragmentation of the West (the U.S. eventually turning to the East) and progressive economic chaos that will strengthen populist forces and undermine the coherence of Western integration structures. [W107]*
- *The least favourable thing for the Polish state would be the further advance of populism at home and abroad. This could lead to disillusionment with the West and a serious crisis in relations with the EU and NATO, perhaps even a Polexit. A serious threat in the context of foreign policy strategy is that the Polish authorities are succumbing to journalism that seeks to push “the thinking of Polish power”. [W116]*
- *Russia’s winning the war with Ukraine through, for example, the tactical use of nuclear weapons, which would create a “chilling effect” among Western elites. Breaking the nuclear taboo would also allow Russia to incorporate Belarus. This would strengthen radical nationalist movements in Western Europe, which around 2025 could gain influence in forming the government in France and (less likely) in Germany, are about to rule in Italy, etc. In the United States, there is also the risk of the return of Trump, or a crisis during the election. In such a situation, China could also behave aggressively. [W89]*
- *[The unfavourable scenario is] Russia’s conquest of large parts of Ukraine, detonation of nuclear weapons and even larger waves of refugees and contamination of border areas. The escalation of the conflict by including Belarus in the war and the start of World War III as a result of a border incident on NATO’s borders and China’s attack on Taiwan [and] Iran’s attack on Israel. Famine and lack of electricity caused by the conflict, hyperinflation and bankruptcy of the Polish state provokes a coup d’état and civil war, in which Germany intervenes militarily carrying slogans of border revision. [W35]*

CHANGES NEEDED

Finally, the experts were asked about the changes needed and reforms in Polish security policy that could improve the position of Poland in Europe. In order to concretise the message coming from the respondents, it was decided to prepare a summary of the most frequently raised suggestions.

- Continue close cooperation in the area of security policy with the US.
- Rebuild cooperation with Western European countries in the areas of common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy.
- Not to wage "war" with the European Commission.
- Reactivate work within the Weimar Triangle (there are great opportunities here).
- Adopt the inviolable principle that plans in the area of state security and defence are cross-party (long-term) and cannot be changed or broken without compelling reasons.
- Rationalise modernisation spending on the Polish Armed Forces by reducing the number of beneficiaries.
- In security policy, accept as an inviolable principle (at least at present) that the basis of Poland's security is NATO, especially the use and implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty.
- Strengthening cooperation with Romania and Finland
- Strengthening cooperation with the Czech Republic and Slovakia
- Modernise the structure (hybridisation and dispersion) of the armed forces
- Don't imitate European countries (too conservative an approach) but follow the concepts of Japan, Korea, the US – which are going as far into the future as possible.
- Increase investment in armaments and reserve training, build new military units
- Optionally, reinstate compulsory military service (3-4 months after high school graduation) so that reservists have at least basic military knowledge (Switzerland has very good solutions)
- Strengthen and audit intelligence and counterintelligence services
- Strive to acquire military equipment abroad, increase orders for Polish equipment to bolster the potential of Polish industry and promote our products
- Pressure the EU, Germany and France to oppose Russia more openly.
- Increase military and arms cooperation with the V4, Three Seas and other NATO partners smaller than Poland. To be a bastion for the realisation of the interests of the new EU countries.
- Enhancing border security, monitoring refugees.
- Civil defence reform
- Addressing corruption and nepotism in the security sectors and their politicisation, i.e., dependence on current political needs rather than on merit.



Experts with different views generally share a common belief that excessive politicisation of any institutions leads to their effectiveness being undermined. Using a scientific perspective – the politicisation of state structures leads to changes in the operation of institutions, as in addition to the legal *logic of consequence* (emphasis on results) an additional political *logic of appropriateness* (emphasis on context, subordination) develops, which slows down decision-making processes and can distort them.

SELECTED QUOTES FROM EXPERTS

- *The hermetic debate on security policy taking place in Poland (...) is characterised by less rationality than the debate on security policy conducted in an open mode (including with the participation of independent think tanks, (...)). Therefore, it is necessary to establish several independent state institutions (e.g., whose director would be appointed for a 10-year term, like the director of the US Library of Congress, overseeing a think tank called the Congressional Research Service), which would have adequate resources (...) and at the same time be able to speak freely in the public debate. It is clear that such think tanks should be established at the most important ministries related to security policy and provide a “safety valve” for open discussion of the security policy directions being pursued. [W27]*
- *Poland needs a “creative presence” and a strengthened role in international alliances and organisations such as NATO and the EU. The existence of such structures allows us to influence the policies of countries larger than ourselves. With a creative presence, we can shape alliances to our needs (...). Particularly important tasks for strengthening our security may include: (1) convincing allies of the strategy to defeat, or at least significantly weaken, Russia in the war with Ukraine; (2) proposing and promoting a special partnership, with security guarantees, with Ukraine until it joins NATO; (3) introducing decision-making procedures in NATO that improve overcoming consensus and ensure the alliance’s rapid response in crisis situations; (4) working to make the alliance’s nuclear policy more appropriate, especially with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, including presenting its own openness to Poland’s participation in expanding “nuclear sharing”; (5) developing the ability to act independently especially*

in difficult-consensus situations. We should also (6) reduce the risk of Polesxit, engage in technological and industrial projects under PESCO. Otherwise we run the risk of being a second-class country that is not talked to, that is passive (...) and to which solutions developed outside can be imposed. [W162]

- *The patriotic narrative will not ensure Poland's internal security, especially when Poland had the highest number of excess COVID-19 deaths in Europe. Poland has fallen here as a state that should provide security for its population. The currently announced process of arming the Polish army is an example of the political elite's magical thinking. Planning around 5% of GDP for defence spending has something of a "Potemkin village" feel to it. During the COVID pandemic, the government failed to protect the population, and will it defend us now, investing tens of billions of PLN in the army? Poland should strengthen its influence (...) by developing reliable cooperation with its allies. Political autarky should be abandoned. The example of Belarus (...) shows that such an attitude accomplishes nothing. [W171]*
- *Poland should work to strengthen its sovereignty by strengthening NATO and the EU, which enable us to articulate our interests and influence powerful states in terms of our needs. (...) It would be useful in achieving these goals to step back from ideological disagreements and accept consensus as a possibility for achieving political goals (difficult to understand in our political culture). The dispute with the EU can be resolved through, for example, (...) a referendum or early elections. [W180]*
- *Make defence and security policy the raison d'être of the state. Consequently, stop taking advantage of the public's low level of education to pursue populist policies in this area (...). So, strengthen relations with allies, not only the US, but also European (...), on similar terms to the Nordic countries), disassociate from Hungary, as a country with a pro-Russian policy and representing its interests in the EU, use arms purchases to modernise the Polish defence industry, treat arms purchases as a means of strengthening alliances (...) with selected countries, build military partnerships through all types of armed forces and use this by those conducting foreign and security policy, introduce limited conscription, make changes in military education, including replacing cadres training officers with those with mission experience (...), [there is a need for] the reconstruction of civil defence and the construction of universal defence (...) and more broadly, professionalism in all spheres of life related to security, starting with those working in state enterprises, ranging from armaments to energy. [W227]*

Warsaw, October 2022

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The first part of the report analyses Poland's international position as a medium-sized state that takes care of its security through both its own policies and alliances. The second part gives the floor to experts who assessed the impact of recent international developments on Polish security policy.

Nowadays, Poland is a medium-sized country with high growth potential. To determine the viability of the medium-sized state in the international system, a survey of dozens of analytical concepts used in international studies was conducted. On this basis, directives for security policy are presented. The first part of the report closes with a comparative analysis of the visions of Poland's security policy presented in the current national discourse. To verify the data collected, it was decided to conduct further qualitative research.

The empirical study includes information on the interviews and expert surveys conducted, and consists of a discussion of selected 9 issues, along with quotes from experts. The following are discussed in turn: the position of Poland after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the consequences of the Madrid NATO summit, the consequences of the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, the strengths and weaknesses of Polish security policy, opportunities and threats to Polish security policy, Poland's international roles, scenarios for Poland, and proposals for improvements in security policy.

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